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The Puzzle of Perceptual Precision
Ned Block
This paper argues for a failure of correspondence between perceptual representa-
tion and what it is like to perceive. If what it is like to perceive is grounded in
perceptual representation, then, using considerations of veridical representation,
we can show that inattentive peripheral perception is less representationally pre-
cise than attentive foveal perception. However, there is empirical evidence to the
contrary. The conclusion is that perceptual representation cannot ground what it
is like to perceive. 
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1 Introduction
Attention increases acuity, allowing the perceiver
to see details that would otherwise be missed. In
addition, for items that the perceiver does actually
see, attention changes their appearance, increasing,
for example, the appearances of contrast, (differ-
ences between light and dark), speed of a moving
object, spatial frequency (a measure of how closely
spaced light and dark areas are) and the size of a
gap—as in Figure  4. But when attention makes
something appear bigger or faster, does it work
like a magnifying glass, trading off a gain in in-
formation at the cost of making something appear
bigger or faster than it is? Or does attentive per-
ception portray the item more as it really is? Or
are  both  percepts  veridical—or  are  both  non-
veridical? Similar issues arise with regard to in-
homogeneities  in  the  visual  field.  Vision  in  the
lower visual field is about 65% more sensitive to
contrast  (and orientation discrimination,  texture
segmentation, gap size, speed, spatial frequency)
than vision equidistant from fixation in the upper
visual field. (See Figure 1 for examples of low and
high contrast.) In addition, there is a great deal of
noise in perceptual systems. Percepts involving the
same area of the visual field and the same degree
of attention will typically differ in visual response
from occasion to occasion. So on different occa-
sions, one can see the same object or event in the
same conditions, with the same degree of atten-
tion, and from the same vantage point and it will
look different in size or speed or contrast because
of random factors.
What is the consequence of these facts for
the  veridicality  of  perception?  One  viewpoint
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Figure 1: Six levels of contrast. The Wikipedia caption reads “Different levels of contrast - original image top left -
less contrast to the left (50%, 75%), more to the right (25%, 50%, 75%)”. I take this to mean that the mid-left photo
has 50% less contrast than the upper left, the lower left photo as 75% less contrast than the upper left, etc. These per -
centages are differences from photoshop, not absolute measures of contrast of the sort to be discussed later in the pa-
per. Percent contrast in the sense to be discussed is the difference between the luminance of the lightest and darkest
parts divided by the sum of these luminances. These images come from the Wikipedia entry on contrast. According to
Wikipedia, “Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free
Documentation License, Version 1.2 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant
Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license is included in the section entitled GNU
Free Documentation License.”
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says that perception is mostly slightly mistaken.
We usually see length, speed and contrast non-
veridically  but  the  extent  of  error  is  small
enough  not  to  be  problematic.  However,  this
viewpoint cannot be right since it is only in vir-
tue of a history of veridical representation both
in our own lives and in the past of our species
that  our  perceptual  representations  even have
representational  contents  (Burge 2010).
Without such a history of veridical representa-
tion it is not clear that perceptual representa-
tion really makes sense.
An alternative way of thinking about the
issue is that perception is sufficiently imprecise
in its representational content for all these vary-
ing percepts to be veridical. If a person is said
to be 5 feet to 6 feet tall on one occasion and 6
feet to 7 feet tall on another, both are veridical
if the person is 6 feet tall. One could put this
by saying that perceptual representation is “in-
tervalic”. The intervals however would have to
be pretty large given the size of these effects—
notably the 65% difference between lower and
upper visual field just mentioned. And it is hard
to square such large differences with the phe-
nomenology  of  foveal  vision.  Hold  a  piece  of
lined paper in front of you. You seem to see the
difference between the white space and the lines
fairly  precisely.  “Irrelevant!,”  you  may  retort,
“Those differences in the visual field affect only
peripheral  perception;  attentive  foveal  percep-
tion is much more precise than inattentive peri-
pheral vision.” And this resolution seems to be
reflected  in  our  phenomenological  judgments:
move the piece of lined paper out to 30o away
from the line of sight. Doesn’t your visual im-
pression of the contrast between the lines and
spaces  seem,  well,  less  precise?  Surprisingly
there  is  evidence  that  unattended  and  peri-
pheral  perception  of  some properties  (notably
contrast) are about as precisely represented in
attentive  foveal  vision  as in  inattentive vision
and vision in the near periphery (up to a 30o
angle from the line of sight). The upshot is that
the phenomenology of perception may mislead
us with regard to the precision of the represent-
ational content of perception.
One might suppose that help will  come
from  bodily  action.  Goodale &  Murphy
presented 5 rectangular blocks to subjects at
various  positions  in  the  visual  field  ranging
from  5o to  70o away  from  the  line  of  sight
(1997). They compared accuracy of perceptual
discrimination of one block from another with
accuracy of  grip  via  a device  that  measured
the aperture between thumb and forefinger as
subjects  reached  out  to  pick  up  one  of  the
blocks. Grip accuracy is roughly the same at
5o as at 70o. The fine details of action are con-
trolled by a largely distinct system from the
system  that  underlies  conscious  vision.  So
what  this  result  dramatically  illustrates  is
that the precision of bodily action is unlikely
to cast any light on the precision of percep-
tual phenomenology. 
This is the puzzle of the title. I argue that
the disconnect may be real and that perceptual
phenomenology may mislead about perceptual
representation. Perceptual phenomenology may
not be grounded in the representational content
of perception. Further, there may be no “phe-
nomenal  content”,  that  is  no  representational
content that emerges from the phenomenology
of perception.1
This is a very long paper so it might be
useful to know what parts to focus on. You can
see the basic lines of the dialectic from reading
sections  1-3.  Sections  4-7 concern  the  experi-
mental  data  concerning  attention  and  can  be
skimmed without losing the thread. The argu-
ment  resumes  with  8-10.  11 can  be  skipped
without loss of continuity. 12 covers some of the
results that the argument is based on. 13 can be
skipped. 14 is the conclusion.
2 Background
This  section  describes  some  assumptions  and
terminology. A simple percept consists of a rep-
resentation of an environmental property and a
singular  element  that  picks  out  an  individual
item (Burge 2010). The representational content
is the condition of veridicality and is satisfied
only if the referent of the singular element has
1 Direct realists reject representational contents, holding instead that
the phenomenology of perception is grounded in what properties one
is directly aware of. They face a parallel set of issues with regard to
the question of how precise the properties are that one is directly
aware of.
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the property  represented by the property-rep-
resentation. The precision of a representation—
in my terminology— is a matter of the range of
values  attributed.  For  example,  consider  two
visual representations of the height of a person,
one representing the person as between 5’6” and
6’  tall,  the  other  representing  the  person  as
between 5’8” and 5’10” tall.  The latter has a
narrower precision. Precision in the sense used
here is not a matter of indeterminacy of borders
but rather the size of the range.2
The claim that the precision of a repres-
entation is wide is a form of the claim that per-
ception is “intervalic”. There are other measures
of perception that are easily confused with pre-
cision.  One of  them is  acuity—also  known as
spatial  resolution.  Acuity is  the ability to re-
solve elements of stimuli. Common measures in
the case of vision are the extent to which the
subject can distinguish one dot from two dots,
detect  a  gap  between  two  figures,  determine
whether a rotating figure is rotating clockwise
rather  than  counter-clockwise,  ascertain
whether two line segments are co-linear, distin-
guish a dotted from a solid line or detect which
side of a Landolt Square a gap is on. (See Fig-
ure 4 for an example of a Landolt Square.)
These and other items of terminology are
gathered together in a glossary at the end of the
article.  Of  course  other  quite  different  defini-
tions of ‘precision’ and ‘acuity’ are just as legit-
imate as these. Note in particular that I am not
using the notion of precision as the inverse of
variance  or  the  notion  of  precision  associated
with the predictive coding literature.
Representationists (also known as repres-
entationalists  and  intentionalists)  think  that
what it is like to have a perceptual experience
—that  is,  the  phenomenology  of  perceptual
experience—is  grounded  in  the  representa-
tional  content  of  the  perception.  (Not  that
representationists  have  used  the  notion  of
grounding, but I believe that it captures what
they have meant.) Representationism is some-
times framed as an identity thesis (e.g., Pautz
2 As  Tim  Williamson  noted  when  some  of  this  material  was
presented  at Oxford,  the fuzziness of the borders is  vagueness
rather  than  imprecision.  Ryan Perkins &  Tim Bayne argue
against  representationism  using  considerations  of  vagueness
(2013).
2010;  Tye 2009): what it is for an experience
to have a certain phenomenal character = for
it to have a certain representational content.
But the identity formulation is inadequate be-
cause  the  phenomenology  is  supposed  to  be
based in the representational content and not
the other way around. Identity is symmetrical.
The grounding characterization of representa-
tionism avoids this problem since grounding is
asymmetrical.  To say that perceptual repres-
entation grounds perceptual phenomenology is
to say that it  is  in virtue of  the representa-
tional  content  of  a  percept  that  it  has  the
phenomenology  it  has.  And  in  virtue  of  is
asymmetrical. (See  Fine 2012 on the concept
of ground and my 2014a for further discussion
of grounding in philosophy of mind.)
Representationism  is  often  framed  in
terms of supervenience: no difference in the phe-
nomenology of perception without a difference
in its representational content. But superveni-
ence does not capture a key motivation behind
representationism:  that  the  representational
content of perception is the source of the phe-
nomenology of perception, that it is in virtue of
the  representational  content  of  the  perception
that it has the phenomenology it has. A super-
venience formulation would entail that a differ-
ence in the precision of phenomenology requires
a  difference  in  representational  content.  How-
ever, on a supervenience formulation of repres-
entationism  it  would  be  a  further  question
whether the phenomenology of perception could
increase  in  precision  without  a  commensurate
increase—or even with a decrease—in precision
of its representational content. On the ground-
ing characterization, any change or difference in
phenomenological  precision  is  dependent  on  a
commensurate change or difference in represent-
ational precision.
The grounding formulation of representa-
tionism rules out some but not all kinds of mul-
tiple realization. Suppose that red782 is  an ex-
ample of the most fine-grained color we can ex-
perience. And suppose that the representation-
ist theory of the experience as of red782 is that
this experience is grounded in representation of
red782. Different experiences as of red782 can be
realized by different  representational  states  so
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long  as  they  all  involve  the  representation  of
red782.
The grounding characterization captures a
representation-first  view  and  excludes  phe-
nomenology-first  doctrines that  are often por-
trayed as representationist. Phenomenology-first
views suppose that phenomenology grounds at
least  some  kinds  of  representational  contents
(Hill 2009;  Kriegel 2011,  2013;  Shoemaker
2007). And it also excludes versions of repres-
entationism that treat both the phenomenology
and  representational  content  of  perception  as
grounded  in  something  else  (Chalmers 2006;
Siegel 2013). That is a plus for the grounding
characterization—distinguishing between funda-
mentally  different  points  of  view.  Although  I
won’t  talk about this  much here,  I  think the
considerations I will be raising will cast doubt
on views that phenomenology grounds any kind
of representational content.3 
The reader may feel that both peripheral
and unattended perception are odd and unim-
portant phenomena that cannot be the test of
any theory of  perception.  However,  peripheral
unattended perception is ubiquitous. The fovea
is the high density center of the retina. If you
hold your hand at arm’s length, your foveal per-
ception encompasses about double the width of
your thumb. Much of perception at any fixation
occurs outside that area and a similar point ap-
plies to attention. However,  even if  you think
that both peripheral and unattended perception
are atypical, you should recognize that atypical
cases often are a window into the nature of a
phenomenon. The experiment in which a beam
of  light  goes  through two slits  was crucial  in
demonstrating a wave aspect of light (Feynman
1988). 
3 Some of the philosophers who call themselves “representationalists”,
for  example  Michael Tye (2009),  have endorsed “object-involving”
representational  contents.  Suppose  I  am looking at a tomato and
having an experience that represents the tomato as being red782. You
are looking at an exactly similar tomato in identical circumstances
and also having an experience that represents it as having red782. Ac-
cording to Tye, we are having phenomenally different experiences in
virtue of looking at different tomatoes. As  Burge has noted in an
article on direct realism (2005), there are object-involving phenom-
enal types (of the sort Tye is talking about), but there are also non-
object-involving phenomenal types. Representationism as  discussed
here is concerned with the latter types. I mentioned in footnote  1
that the same issues about precision arise for direct realism—and the
same applies to Tye’s view.
3 The inhomogeneous visual field
Although this article is mainly about differences
in perception wrought by differences in attention,
it will be helpful to start with a discussion of sim-
ilar issues that arise independently of attention
because  of  the  massive  inhomogeneities  in  the
visual field. I will discuss the perception of con-
trast. The visual system is much more sensitive to
differences in luminance than to luminance itself
and contrast is a matter of luminance differences.
(Luminance  is  a  measure of  the  light  reflected
from a  surface.)  Contrast  can  be  defined  in  a
number of different ways, all ways of capturing
the average difference in luminance between the
light and dark parts of an array. The four patches
in Figure 2 have roughly equal apparent contrasts
if one is fixating the cross though there is sub-
stantial variation among persons in comparative
sensitivities in the visual field. But the top patch
has a 30% contrast and the bottom patch has a
15% contrast. (To fixate the cross is to point your
eyes at it.) Vision in the lower visual field (the
South) has about 65% better sensitivity than vis-
ion in the upper visual field on average along the
“vertical meridian” (the vertical line through the
fixation  point)  for  points  of  equal  eccentricity.
And sensitivity is better along the horizontal me-
ridian than the vertical meridian, that is East and
West have higher sensitivity than points of equal
eccentricity in the North and South. This sensit-
ivity advantage is  about 63%. Marisa Carrasco
suggests that the advantage of the horizontal over
vertical meridians probably has to do with the
presence of more relevant information on the hori-
zontal meridian (Carrasco et al. 2001). These dif-
ferences  in  sensitivity  manifest  themselves  phe-
nomenologically in differences among patches re-
quired for  equal  apparent  contrasts.  It  takes a
30% contrast patch in the North to phenomenolo-
gically match a 10% contrast patch in the East at
the equal eccentricity depicted in Figure  2. Per-
formance asymmetries along these lines have been
observed for gap size, spatial frequency (roughly
density of stripes), orientation discrimination, tex-
ture segmentation, letter recognition and motion
perception. Performance asymmetries of this sort
have been shown in comparisons between an on-
screen stimulus and a stimulus from the recent
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past in visual short term memory for 1-3 seconds,
albeit at a slightly lower level (Montaser-Kouhsari
& Carrasco 2009). These differences are thought
to be due to anatomical asymmetries (Abrams et
al. 2012). 
I will assume that the percepts of North and
East  have  the  same  contrast  phenomenologies
when seen (simultaneously) in peripheral vision.
Of course the fact that they don’t look different
does  not  prove  that  they  look  the  same.  And
their looking the same does not prove that the
phenomenology of each of the two patches is the
same— as we know from the phenomenal Sorites
problem (Morrison 2013). However, the fact that
they look the same is evidence that they are the
same phenomenologically and we would need a
reason to resist that conclusion. Similar issues will
be taken up later in section 8 and 10.
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Figure 2: If you fixate (i.e., point your eyes at) the plus sign, these four different patches should look roughly equal in
contrast at normal reading distance (roughly 15 inches away). The one above the horizontal meridian has twice the con-
trast of the one below the meridian (30% vs 15%). The two patches on the horizontal meridian have 10% contrast. It
takes a 30% patch in the North to match the 10% patch equidistant from the plus sign in the East. Much of the work
of investigating this phenomenon comes from Marisa Carrasco’s lab. See  Cameron et al. (2002) and  Carrasco et al.
(2001). Note that there is a large degree of variation from person to person so the patches may not look exactly the
same in contrast to you. (The patches are called “Gabor patches” or sometimes just gabors.) Thanks to Jared Abrams
for making this figure for me. @copyright Ned Block
www.open-mind.net
I  take it  as obvious that the North and
East patches are determinately different in ap-
parent contrast when sequentially foveated and
attended. The fact that the percepts are sequen-
tial makes it unlikely that we are misled about
the determinate difference by any analog of the
“beats” one hears when guitar strings vibrate at
slightly different pitches. (I will return to this
issue in section 10.)
North  and  East  look  the  same  in  peri-
pheral vision and different in foveal vision. How
could this be explained in terms of representa-
tional  content?  The  only  representational  ex-
planation I can think of would be based on the
idea that the content of foveal representation of
contrast  is  more  precise  than  the  content  of
peripheral representation of contrast. However,
as I will explain below, there is evidence that
the representation of contrast in the fovea is the
same in precision as the representation of con-
trast in the periphery. So the burden is on the
representationist  to  explain  the  difference
between foveal and peripheral experience of con-
trast without appeal to a difference in repres-
entational precision. I will now turn to a much
longer version of the argument which does not
have the form of a burden of proof argument
but which makes use of the notion of phenom-
enal precision. 
I claim that when you fixate on and at-
tend to the cross, both your perception of the
North patch and your perception of  the East
patch  normally  veridically  represent  the  con-
trasts of those patches despite the fact that one
sees them only in peripheral vision. Many de-
tails  cannot  be  seen  in  peripheral  vision  but
what can be seen is seen veridically in normal
circumstances. Of course the comparisons are il-
lusory:  patches  that  are  different  in  contrast
look the  same.  But the issue  I  am raising  is
whether  the  individual  percepts  of  single
patches are illusory. One reason to think there
is no illusion is that the same kind of differences
in perception caused by spatial inhomogeneities
in the visual field occur in all percepts due to
temporal inhomogeneities—that  is,  random
noise in the visual system that differs from per-
cept to percept. Any two percepts of the same
items at the same point in the visual field with
the same degree of attention are likely to differ
in apparent contrast (and other properties) due
to these random factors. It is hard to see a ra-
tionale for supposing that spatial inhomogeneit-
ies engender illusion while claiming the opposite
for  temporal  inhomogeneities.  And  claiming
that  both engender illusion would make most
perception illusory.
This is where my appeal to Tyler Burge’s
recent book comes in (2010). As Burge notes,
we  can  explain  the  operation  of  constancy
mechanisms  in  perception  only  by  appeal  to
their  function  in  veridically  representing  the
distal environment. And that function precludes
perception being mostly non-veridical.4
I will say more by way of justification of
the verididality claim later but for now let us
accept  that  claim  and  think  about  the  con-
sequences for representationism. Note that the
veridicality  assumption  is  meant  to  apply  to
non-categorical  perception  of  properties  that
admit of degrees and is not meant to apply to
categorical  perception.  Afraz et  al. (2010)
showed that gender neutral faces are more likely
to look male in some areas of the visual field
and female in others. The veridical percept in
this  case  would  represent  the  gender-neutral
faces  as  androgynous so both of  the percepts
described are non-veridical. Many varying mag-
4 The  popular  “predictive  coding”  framework  (Clark 2013;  Hohwy
2013) is a kind of Bayesian approach that is sometimes thought to
provide a revolutionary alternative to the view of perception as con-
stitutively involving veridically conditions. Of course all of vision sci-
ence involves a background of Bayesian probabilistic processes. And
prediction in  the visual  system is  ubiquitous  and important.  But
these approaches do not undermine the veridicality of perception. A
recent  review  of  Jakob  Hohwy’s  2013  book  on  predictive  coding
(Wilkinson 2014) singles  out  the  predictive  coding  explanation of
binocular rivalry  as  the parade case,  claiming that  the predictive
coding framework “provides a very satisfying account of binocular
rivalry.” Clark (2013, pp. 184-185) also emphasizes the supposed ex-
planation of binocular rivalry. Binocular rivalry is a surprising visual
phenomenon in which different stimuli  are  presented at the same
time to the two eyes, e.g., a face to one eye and a house to the other.
What  the  subject  sees  however  is  an  alternation  between  a  face
filling the whole visual field, then a house, then a face, etc. It is
widely agreed in vision science that the rough outline of the binocu-
lar rivalry phenomenon is explained by a combination of reciprocal
inhibition and adaptation: the competing interpretations reciprocally
inhibit one another, and when one is in the ascendancy, adaptation
weakens it until the other takes over. Hohwy and his colleagues more
or less concede this (Hohwy et al. 2008) saying that the predictive
coding framework explains why we have reciprocal inhibition and ad-
aptation in the first place. But to the extent that this reflects what
is good about the predictive coding framework, it is not a revolution-
ary alternative to standard vision science but rather an evolutionary
gloss on it.
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nitudes such as size and contrast are not per-
ceived categorically in this way so there is no
corresponding  “reality  check”  for  such  mag-
nitudes. (Some magnitudes such as orientation
may mix categorical and non-categorical percep-
tion.)
A percept that attributes a property to an
item is veridical only if the item has the attrib-
uted property. However,  the veridical percepts
of North and East (when fixating the cross) at-
tribute the same contrast property since they
look the same in contrast. Let us ask what the
content of the (veridical) percepts of North and
East are when one is fixating the cross and they
look the same in contrast. That is, what con-
trast would the percepts of North and East at-
tribute to those patches? Since East is a 10%
patch and North is a 30% patch, and both are
veridical, it follows that the percepts have to at-
tribute the same contrast to them (since they
look the same). What attributions would be the
same  and  also  veridical?  The  patches  would
have to be represented as having a range of con-
trasts  between 10% and  30% at  a  minimum.
That is, the minimal imprecision in the repres-
entation is 20%, the imprecision of a representa-
tion  of  10%-30% contrast  (including  the  end-
points). 
Now let us ask what the contrast-content
is  when  we  fixate  (and  attend  to)  the  East
patch,  the  10% patch.  If  the  precision  is  the
same as in peripheral perception (i.e., 20%), the
percept  could  have  a  content  of  10% plus  or
minus  10%,  i.e.,  0% to  20%.  (A 0% contrast
patch would be invisible, so presumably impre-
cision ranges should be weighted towards higher
absolute  values  of  the  magnitude  perceived.
Variability in perceptual response increases with
the absolute value of the magnitude perceived—
one form of the Weber-Fechner Law. This is a
complication that I will mainly ignore.) And for
similar reasons, if the precision is the same in
foveal as in peripheral perception, the contrast
content of the percept of the North patch when
one fixates it would be 20%-40%.
The representational precision is 20% but
what about the phenomenal precision? Can we
make sense of this idea? As with all that is phe-
nomenal, no definition is possible. The best that
we can do is indicate a phenomenon that the
reader has to experience for him or herself. One
type of example exploits the difference between
an object close up and the same object at a dis-
tance.  An object  may look to have the same
properties at both distances but with different
precisions. An object may look crimson close up
but merely red (and not any particular shade)
at a distance.
If  the  phenomenology  of  perception  is
grounded in its representational content and if
there is such a thing as phenomenal precision,
an increase in phenomenal precision depends on
a corresponding increase in representational pre-
cision.  Representational  precision  can  be  in-
dexed  numerically—a  representational  content
of the length of something as 1 inch—2 inches
(i.e.,  between 1 and 2 inches) is  more precise
than a representational content of it as 1 inch—
3 inches.  According to representationism, phe-
nomenal precision is just the phenomenology of
the precision of representational content. We ex-
perience a percept with representational content
of  1  inch-2  inches  as  having  more  (i.e.,  nar-
rower, smaller range) precision—as being more
phenomenally  determinate—  than  we  experi-
ence a percept with representational content 1
inch—3 inches.5 
Note that I am not saying that we can al-
ways ask whether a certain item of phenomeno-
logy is more precise or less precise than a cer-
tain  representational  content  (though  I  think
there  are  some  cases  where  this  does  make
sense). What I am saying is that a representa-
tionist has to hold that a difference in phenom-
enal  precision  is  grounded  in  a  difference—of
the appropriate sign and magnitude—of repres-
entational precision.
Here  is  the  application  of  these  ideas
about precision: Foveate North and East in turn
(i.e., serially). I claim that they look determin-
ately different.  According to what I  mean by
looking  determinately  different,  for  items  to
look determinately different, their phenomenolo-
5 For a direct realist, phenomenal precision is just the precision of the
properties  we are  directly aware of.  We can be directly  aware of
properties with different precisions, for example, crimson, or altern-
atively red. Similarly we can be directly aware of a 10%-20% con-
trast property and also a 10%-30% contrast property and the differ-
ence constitutes a phenomenal precision difference.
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gies cannot be almost  completely overlapping.
Why is lack of almost complete overlap import-
ant?  The  representational  contents  of  percep-
tion can be very imprecise even though discrim-
ination is fine grained. One might represent one
patch  as  10%-30%  in  contrast  and  another
patch as 10.5%-30.5% and as noted by  Jeremy
Goodman (2013) that would in principle allow
for  discrimination  between  them.  If  the  phe-
nomenal precision of these percepts is also very
wide,  then  the  phenomenologies  of  these  per-
cepts would not be determinately different from
one  another—given  what  I  mean  by  these
terms. 
Don’t get me wrong: I do think that items
can look different on the basis of different but
overlapping contents. For example, if one is fo-
veating a patch and simultaneously sees a patch
of  the same contrast  in  peripheral  vision,  the
two will look different in contrast. Each of the
two percepts can be veridical (even though the
comparative  percept  is  not).  And  being
veridical and being of the same contrast, the in-
tervallic contents have to overlap. 
You may be skeptical about whether there
is  such  a  thing  as  phenomenal  precision  and
whether  there  is  such a thing  as  phenomenal
overlap. But a representationist should not be
skeptical.  If  one’s  visual  experience  represents
one length as between 1 inch and 2 inches and a
second as between 1 inch and 3 inches, then it
is  hard  to  see  how  a  representationist  could
deny  that  the  phenomenal  character  that  is
grounded in the first is more precise than the
phenomenal character that is  grounded in the
second. And if one patch is represented as 10%-
30% in contrast and another  patch as 10.5%-
30.5% the representationist would need a good
reason to claim that the phenomenologies  did
not almost completely overlap. Given that rep-
resentationism would seem to be committed to
phenomenal precision and phenomenal overlap,
it would seem legitimate to assume them in an
argument against representationism.
North and East look the same when fixat-
ing the cross and determinately different when
fixating (and attending) to each in turn. What
does this fact tell us about representational and
phenomenal precisions? The phenomenal preci-
sion of perception of contrast must be narrower
(i.e., smaller range, greater precision) in foveal
vision than in peripheral vision—in order to ex-
plain why North and East look the same in re-
spect  of  contrast  in  peripheral  vision  but  de-
terminately different in foveal vision. Even if we
cannot make sense of an absolute value of phe-
nomenal precision at least we can make sense of
differences in it.  We might think of  this as a
phenomenal precision principle: 
If two things look the same in peripheral
vision and determinately different in foveal
vision,  then  the phenomenal  precision  of
foveal  vision  is  narrower  (smaller  range)
than that of peripheral vision. 
At least for one of the foveal percepts, and why
would one have narrower precision but not the
other? And so according to the representation-
ist, representational precision must be narrower
in foveal than in peripheral vision as well—oth-
erwise there would be a difference in phenom-
enal precision that was not grounded in a differ-
ence  in  representational  precision.  (The  peri-
pheral perceptions are simultaneous and the fo-
veal perceptions are serial. The inhomogeneities
described here hold both for  simulaneous and
serial presentations, albeit at a slightly reduced
level  in  serial  presentations.  This  has  been
shown  separately  for  inhomogeneities  in  the
visual  field  (Montaser-Kouhsari &  Carrasco
2009) and for the attentional effects to be dis-
cussed later (Rolfs et al. 2013)).
Note that as far as the doctrine of super-
venience of phenomenology on representation is
concerned, North and East could look the same
but still be represented differently. The ground-
ing formulation says: With qualifications to be
mentioned:  different  representational  contents
require  different  phenomenologies;  superveni-
ence speaks to the converse only. Qualifications:
there  may  be  different  representational  para-
meters, only one of which is the ground of the
relevant phenomenology. So there could be mul-
tiple  representational  realizations  of  a  single
type of phenomenal state where the representa-
tional differences reflect differences in the para-
meters  that are irrelevant to grounding.  And:
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phenomenology might be grounded in represent-
ational content even though the grain of phe-
nomenology is coarser than that of representa-
tional content. So there might be differences in
fine-grained  representational  content  that  do
not make a phenomenal difference. 
No one would object to the idea that pure
dispositions like fragility or solubility could be
grounded  in  different  molecular  structures  in
the case of different substances. And physical-
ists  about  phenomenology have  held  that  the
underlying basis  of  a common phenomenology
might be one physical state in humans and an-
other  in  robots.  However,  I  have  argued that
the grounding framework reveals that physical-
ists should not acknowledge this kind of mul-
tiple realizability (2014a). Applied to this case,
the  idea  is  that  a  representationist  account
should give us a representationist answer to the
question  of  what it  is  in  virtue of  which the
phenomenology  of  the  peripheral  percepts  of
North  and  East  are  the  same.  Phenomenal
sameness requires representational sameness as
a ground. And that  representational  sameness
in this case has to be a precision range of 10%-
30% or more.
Of course the notions of phenomenal preci-
sion and almost complete overlap of phenomen-
ologies  are  obscure.  The  methodological  situ-
ation we are in is that we have a well-developed
science of perception but very little science of
the phenomenology of perception. One response
—very common until  recently—is to avoid is-
sues of phenomenology like the plague. But the
time may be ripe to try to leverage the science
of perception to get some insight into the phe-
nomenology  of  perception.  And  that  project
cannot help but start with some vague intuitive
notions.
Here is  where we are:  foveal  percepts  of
the contrasts of North and East are determin-
ately different in phenomenology but peripheral
percepts of them are the same in phenomeno-
logy so the phenomenal precision of North and
East,  each seen  foveally  is  narrower  than the
phenomenal  precision of  North and East seen
peripherally. If representationism is to avoid a
difference in phenomenal precision that is  not
based in a corresponding and commensurate dif-
ference  (of  the  right  direction)  in  representa-
tional precision, then representational precision
has  to  be  narrower  in  foveal  than  peripheral
perception. That is, the representationist should
hold that peripheral perception is less represent-
ationally precise than foveal perception.
Here comes the punch line: Robert Hess &
David Field (1993) compared the discrimination
of the locations and contrasts of patches of dif-
ferent  contrasts.  They  presented  triples  of
patches in which the middle patches could differ
from the flankers in (1) locations and (2) con-
trasts. They asked subjects two questions con-
cerning each triple:  whether the middle patch
differed from the flanker patches in location and
contrast. What they found was that discrimina-
tion  of  locations  falls  off  greatly  in  the  peri-
phery but discrimination of contrasts does not.
They  conclude  (pp.  2664,  2666),  “… we show
that for normal periphery, elevated spatial un-
certainty is not associated with elevated levels
of contrast uncertainty at any spatial scale… A
change  in  positional  error  of  a  factor  of  14…
from the fovea to the periphery has an associ-
ated contrast error that does not significantly
increase over the same range of eccentricities.”
The graphs are striking: position error increases
greatly  with  peripherality  of  the  stimuli  but
contrast error is a flat line. See Figure 3 for one
of the figures that illustrates this fact. As far as
I can tell, this result is widely accepted. Even a
critical reply (Levi &  Klein 1996) says “Their
results (discussed below) show that position dis-
crimination is selectively degraded in the peri-
phery, while contrast discrimination is not af-
fected.” Levi and Klein dispute the alleged ex-
planation of the result, not the result. 
Note that I am taking the fact that con-
trast discrimination does not diminish in peri-
pheral vision to be evidence that representa-
tional  precision  does  not  decrease  in  peri-
pheral vision.  Hess &  Field (1993) describe a
model of the result in terms of constant “un-
certainty” for contrast across the visual field
but increasing uncertainty for location. Their
concern is whether the subjects’ visual repres-
entations produce locational errors as a result
of  “undersampling”.  They  argue  that  under-
sampling  should  affect  contrast  errors  too.
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And because it does not, they conclude that
the explanation is “uncalibrated neural disar-
ray”: “We propose that, for reasons as yet un-
known,  the  periphery,  unlike  the  fovea,  has
not undergone sufficient self-calibration to re-
solve all of its innate anatomical neuronal dis-
order…” (p.  2669). But we don’t have to buy
into neural disarray to accept the observation
that contrast uncertainty does not decrease in
the periphery.
We feel that foveal attended perception is
“crisp”,  i.e.,  high  in  precision  but  for  some
properties—contrast and probably gap size, spa-
tial frequency (stripe density) and speed—there
is  some reason to think that  foveal  and peri-
pheral perception are equally precise. The resol-
ution is that some properties—e.g.,  location—
really are represented more imprecisely in the
periphery than in the fovea (by a factor of 14).
(And some properties  seem to be  represented
more precisely in the periphery, e.g., flicker rate
for some spatial frequencies;  Strasburger et al.
2011). So we can’t think of peripheral percep-
tion as imprecise in regard to all properties we
can see. And for the properties that do not de-
cline in precision in the periphery, the repres-
entational point of view doesn’t seem to work
very well.
Acuity is lower in the periphery than in fo-
veal vision.  Anton-Erxleben & Carrasco (2013)
describe  five  mechanisms  that  jointly  explain
the decrease in  acuity  with eccentricity.  Cone
density and the density of the retinal ganglion
cells that process cone signals decrease with ec-
centricity.  In addition,  average receptive fields
are larger in the periphery. (The receptive field
of a neuron is the area of space that a neuron
responds to. See glossary.) So the elements of a
grid will not be visible in the periphery if they
are  too  finely  spaced  (i.e.,  if  the  spatial  fre-
quency  is  too  high).  To  compensate  for  this,
Hess & Field used only very coarse grids in the
periphery. So what the result suggests is that
contrast  uncertainty  does  not  increase  in  the
periphery—for grids that one can actually see
in the periphery. 
But why do the behavioral results reflect
on representational  precision rather  than phe-
nomenal precision? The anatomical asymmetries
that are the probable basis of the inhomogeneit-
ies  discussed here  are bound to affect  uncon-
scious perception in the same way as conscious
perception.
The Hess & Field result shows a kind of
homogeneity in the visual field in regard to con-
trast but as I have emphasized in regard to the
phenomenon of Figure  2, the visual field is in-
homogeneous  in  regard  to  contrast.  How  are
these compatible? The inhomogeneities in Fig-
ure 1 reflect contrast sensitivity whereas the ho-
mogeneity showed by Hess & Field reflect con-
trast precision.
Here is the argument summarized:
1. The peripheral percepts of North and East,
being  the same in contrast  phenomenology,
are the same in contrast-representational con-
tents—if phenomenology is grounded in rep-
resentation.
2. The peripheral percepts of  North and East
are both veridical;  that is,  North and East
have  the  properties  attributed  to  them  in
peripheral perception.
3. Given veridicality and the difference between
North and East in actual contrast, the rep-
resentational contents of the peripheral per-
cepts must be rather imprecise. Since North
is 30% and East is 10%, and since the con-
tent characterizes both, the peripheral repres-
entational  contrast-content  has  a  precision
range of at least 10%-30%.
4. Foveal percepts of North and East—one at a
time—  are  determinately  different  in  phe-
nomenology
5. The  phenomenal  precision  principle:  If  two
things look the same in peripheral vision and
determinately different in foveal vision, then
the phenomenal precision of foveal vision is
narrower (smaller range) than that of  peri-
pheral vision. 
6. So  the  phenomenal  precision  of  the  foveal
percepts of North and East must be narrower
than that of the peripheral percepts of these
patches.
7. Representationism requires that a difference
in  phenomenal  precision  be  grounded  in  a
commensurate  difference  in  representational
precision.
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8. So representationism requires that the foveal
representational  precision  be  narrower  than
the  peripheral  representational  precision.
However  the  experimental  facts  suggest
maybe not.6 
6 This argument can be stated in direct realist terms but it would re-
quire an analog of the veridical/illusory distinction in direct realist
terms. See Block (2010) and footnote 14.
9. Conclusion:  there  is  some  reason  to  think
that the phenomenology of perception is not
grounded in its representational content.
10. The same argument applies to views that
hold that there is a kind of “phenomenolo-
gical representational content” that emanates
from  the  phenomenology  of  perception
(Bayne 2014;  Chalmers 2004;  Horgan &
Tienson 2002). If there were such a thing, it
would have to be precise enough to properly
reflect phenomenology but imprecise enough
to  handle  the  veridicality  considerations
raised here. And the argument presented here
suggests that can’t happen.
The premise that I think needs the most justi-
fication is 4. Do we really have enough of a grip
on what it is for percepts to be determinately
different in phenomenology to justify the idea
that  the  foveal  percepts  do  not  have  almost
completely overlapping phenomenal characters? 
Given the problem with 4, I should remind
the reader that I started with an argument that
did not appeal to phenomenal precision. North
and East look the same in peripheral vision and
determinately  different  in  foveal  vision.  How
could this be explained in terms of representa-
tional content without appealing to a difference
in representational precision between fovea and
periphery? This argument has the usual prob-
lem of a burden of proof argument but it has
the advantage of avoiding the obscurity of phe-
nomenal precision.
Another  more  introspective  route  to  the
same  conclusion  derives  from the  point  men-
tioned at the beginning that it is natural to feel
that the phenomenology of seeing the contrast
between lines and spaces foveally differs in pre-
cision from seeing the same lines peripherally.
The foveal percept seems more “crisp” than the
peripheral percept. If this intuitive judgment is
correct, there is a discrepancy between the pre-
cision  of  phenomenology  and  the  precision  of
representational content.
I  think this argument gives the reader a
pretty good idea of the dialectic of the paper
though the paper is more concerned with the is-
sue of change in precision due to differences in
attention than with peripherality. 
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Figure  3:  This is  one of  four  graphs from (Hess &
Field 1993) showing the comparison between the sens-
itivity to contrast as compared with the sensitivity to
location.  The Y-axis  represents  foveal  sensitivity  di-
vided by peripheral sensitivity so a value of more than
1 represents greater foveal sensitivity. The solid dots
represent contrast sensitivity whereas the open circles
represent  location  sensitivity.  The  top  graph  shows
sensitivity up to 30 degrees from the line of sight for a
very coarse grid of 1.3 cycles per degree. The bottom
two graphs show sensitivity for finer grids but at much
lower  eccentricities.  (Coarse  grids  are  visible  in  the
periphery  but  fine  grids  would  look  like  a  uniform
gray surface  in  the  periphery.)  Foveal  discrimination
thresholds are given an aribitrary value of 1. (This is
referred to in the article as the values being “normal-
ized”.) What this figure and the other 3 figures show
is  that  contrast  sensitivity  for  grids  that  are  coarse
enough to see is the same in the periphery as in the
fovea  but  location  sensitivity  is  much  worse  in  the
periphery.  Reprinted  with  permission  of  Vision  Re-
search.
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Worth Boone has argued against my point
of view using two-point thresholds of tactile dis-
crimination (2013).7 As I will  explain, I think
some of the issues he raises actually support my
conclusion.
Boone  noted  that  there  are  large  differ-
ences in representational determinacy (precision
in  my  terminology)  between  tactile  acuity  as
measured  by  two-point  thresholds  at  various
points on the body but that—contrary to what
I have said— the precision of the phenomeno-
logy  matches  the  precision  of  the  representa-
tional content. 
First,  what  are  two-point  thresholds?
“Subjective” two-point thresholds are based on
one or two sharp points (e.g., pencil points) be-
ing  placed  at  constant  separations  at  various
body parts, with subjects reporting whether it
feels like there are two points or one point. Ob-
jective  two-point  thresholds  are  measured  by
stimulating  the  skin  with  either  one  or  two
sharp points and observing to what extent the
subjects are able to discriminate between these
stimuli.  Objective  thresholds  are  based  on
whether there actually are two rather than one
point  whereas  subjective  thresholds  are  based
simply on the judgments themselves, independ-
ently of their accuracy. The subjective method
shows extremely high variability within a single
subject on the same body part for a variety of
reasons. The objective method has a number of
paradoxical features that I won’t go into but if
you are interested you can read a short article
dramatically titled “The Two-Point Threshold:
Not  a  Measure  of  Tactile  Spatial  Resolution”
(Craig & Johnson 2000). 
However,  a  recent  review  (Tong et  al.
2013) suggests better measures of tactile acuity
that confirm Boone’s point that tactile acuity
varies enormously from one part of the skin to
another. A glance at a graph in the Tong, et. al.
paper reveals that acuity on the tip of the fin-
ger is about 5 times that of the palm and about
20 times the acuity on the forearm. 
We can ask: is the phenomenology of these
perceptions as imprecise as the representational
content? Boone says yes but he is judging the
7 I used Figure 2 in a talk at Pittsburgh where Boone was in the audi-
ence on November 2, 2012.
phenomenology  of  two-point  perception.  That
method is doubly illicit, first because it is un-
clear that two point discrimination is a measure
of anything tactile. Second, the two point judg-
ments  may simply reflect  the  representational
contents rather than or in addition to the phe-
nomenology,  contaminating the verdict on the
very point at issue. If you ask someone how de-
terminate their phenomenology of a two point
stimulus is, they may simply be reporting how
sure  they  are  they  are  perceiving  two  points
rather than one. The latter is suggested by con-
siderations  of  representational  “transparency”
or  “diaphanousness”  of  experience  (Stoljar
2004)8. As Thomas Metzinger puts it, we “look
through” the experience to its object (2003, p.
173). If so, the phenomenology of judging one
vs two may be contaminating the judgment of
the precision of the percept.
So I will ask again: Do the differences in
phenomenological  precision  between  fingertip
and  palm  and  between  fingertip  and  foream
perception differ by factors of 5 and 20? The
question  is  not  well  formed:  we  cannot  ask
about  either  phenomenological  or  representa-
tional precision without specifying what is being
represented. 
To get a better question, let us focus on
the perception of location. Representational loc-
ational imprecision does vary with location on
the body.  The explanation of  the variation is
that  the  number  and  spatial  distribution  of
sensory receptors that feed into a single sensory
neuron (i.e.,  the receptive field of the sensory
neuron) varies widely over the body.9 Is there a
matching  change  in  the  phenomenal  precision
with regard to location? If there were a massive
decrease in representational precision of location
from fingertip to forearm without a correspond-
ing decrease in phenomenal precision, we would
have  a  violation  of  grounding  (of  a  different
kind  from those  already  discussed).  I  suggest
you put a single pencil point on your finger tip
8 G. E. Moore (1903) famously said “... the moment we try to fix
our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it
is,  it  seems to vanish:  it  seems as  if  we had before  us  a mere
emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all
we can see is the blue; the other element is as if it were diaphan -
ous ...”
9 For an amusing account  of  the facts  surrounding these  issues  see
Ramachandran & Hirstein (1998).
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and then on your palm and forearm. (Or if you
have a helper, do them simultaneously.) If there
is  a five-fold  or  twenty-fold difference in  phe-
nomenological precision of location it should be
appreciable with any stimulus.  My own intro-
spective judgment is that there is little or no
difference in precision of representation despite
the  five-fold  difference  between  the  fingertip
and palm and 20-fold difference between the fin-
gertip and forearm. I am pretty sure that the
percepts  are  not  determinately  different.  No
doubt  people  differ  both  in  these  experiences
and in their introspective access to them. And
with  all  difficult  phenomenal  judgments,  con-
tamination  by  theory  is  no  doubt  a  major
source of variability. 
If my judgment is right, we have a case of
a  difference  in  representational  precision
without a corresponding difference in phenom-
enal  precision.  In  the  visual  case  just  men-
tioned, we have evidence for a difference in phe-
nomenal precision without a corresponding dif-
ference in representational precision. Taken to-
gether, the cases suggest a considerable discon-
nect  between  perceptual  phenomenology  and
perceptual representation.
The conclusion of this section is that there
is some reason to think that there is no repres-
entational  content  of  perception  that  either
grounds or is grounded by the phenomenology
of perception—what it is like to perceive. 
The reader may wonder how there could
be such a disconnect between the phenomeno-
logy of perception and its representational con-
tent. I mentioned the fact that grip accuracy is
about the same in the far periphery (70o off the
line of sight) as it is close to the line of sight
(5o) despite the fact that conscious vision is ex-
tremely  weak  in  the  far  periphery.  Conscious
vision is a distinct system from the system that
underlies the fine details of perceptually guided
action. Though I am not alleging that the sys-
tem underlying conscious perception is distinct
from the system underlying perceptual repres-
entation, the upshot of this paper is that they
are partially distinct.
In  what  follows,  I  will  be  arguing  that
facts about attention motivate a similar argu-
ment for a discrepancy between the phenomeno-
logy of perception and its representational con-
tent. The reason I went through the argument
based on inhomogeneities first is that the issues
are straightforward compared with the corres-
ponding issues concerning attention. Attention
is a complicated phenomenon about which there
is a great deal of disagreement, so the rest of
the paper has many twists and turns. The argu-
ment form as presented so far will not resume
until section 8.
4 Attention affects appearance
William James (1890, p. 404) famously said at-
tention “… is the taking possession by the mind,
in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem
several simultaneously possible objects or trains
of thought. Focalization, concentration, of con-
sciousness  are  of  its  essence.  It  implies  with-
drawal from some things in order to deal effect-
ively with others.” Except for the exclusion of
unconscious attention, most scientists would ac-
cept something like that characterization today.
Spatial attention is attention directed to a por-
tion of environmental space and is distinct from
attention to an individual (e.g., a thing, a sur-
face or a property instance) or to a property.
The  mechanisms  of  attention  are  fairly
well understood. Spatial attention boosts neural
activation  in  circuits  that  process  information
from the spatial area that is attended, inhibit-
ing activation in circuits that process informa-
tion from adjacent areas. Feature-based atten-
tion boosts neural activation for attended fea-
tures, inhibiting neural activation for other fea-
tures. Object based attention does the analog-
ous task for objects. Feature-based attention re-
fines selectivity for the attended feature whereas
spatial attention refines selectivity for the atten-
ded area of space (Carrasco 2011;  Ling et al.
2014).
The main body of this paper is concerned
with the effect of the modulation of spatial at-
tention on phenomenology and representational
content. Except when mentioned explicitly, I am
talking about spatial attention rather than at-
tention to a property instance or an object. My
argument is based on experiments that indicate
that attention affects appearance. To begin, at-
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tention affects perceptual acuity, one measure of
which is whether one can detect whether there
is  a  gap  or  what  side  it  is  on  in  a  Landolt
square.  (For examples  of  Landolt  sqaures,  see
Figure 4.)
Figure 4:  Landolt squares, i.e., squares with gaps. The
subjects’ task in the experiment diagrammed in Figure 4
was to report (via key presses) whether the gap is on the
left or on the right. The squares were presented at various
locations while the subject was fixating in the middle of
the screen. Redrawn from Yeshurun & Carrasco (1999).
Yaffa Yeshurun & Marisa Carrasco (1999)
asked subjects to press different keys depending
on whether a Landolt square had a gap on the
left or the right. The Landolt square could be
presented at any of 16 different locations of 3
different eccentricities. In half of the trials, the
square was preceded by a green bar presented
briefly  at  the  location  in  which  the  square
would appear.  Then after  a  pause,  a  Landolt
square  appeared  in  the  same  location  as  the
line, and then a noise “mask” was presented to
prevent an ongoing iconic representation of the
stimulus. The subject was supposed to press a
key indicating which side the gap was on. See
Figure 5 for the sequence of presentations. (An
icon  would  introduce  an  unwanted  source  of
variability  since  “iconic  memory”  varies  from
person to person. A later experiment (Carrasco
et al. 2002) obtained similar results without a
mask.) The result is that subjects were more ac-
curate and also faster when the cue indicated
the location of the square than when there was
no  cue.  Similar  results  were  shown  for  other
acuity  tests,  e.g.,  distinguishing  a  dotted  line
from a solid line. 
This experiment involves “exogenous” at-
tention in which the subject’s attention is auto-
matically attracted by a highly visible change,
e.g.,  a  sudden motion or  disappearance  of  an
object.  A similar effect has been shown when
the subject is told, for example, to attend to the
right when a central bar points in that direc-
tion. This  is  a matter of  “endogenous” atten-
tion. Exogenous spatial attention is sometimes
referred to as “transient” or “bottom-up” atten-
tion,  whereas  endogenous  spatial  attention  is
“sustained” or “top-down”. Exogenous attention
is involuntary whereas endogenous attention is
voluntary. Exogenous spatial attention peaks by
120 ms after the cue, whereas endogenous spa-
tial attention requires at least 300 ms to peak
and has no known upper temporal limit. 
Using a similar paradigm and comparing
the effects of exogenous and endogenous atten-
tion (Montagna et al. 2009), researchers showed
that  endogenous  attention  decreased  the min-
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Figure 5: Yeshurun & Carrasco (1999) asked subjects
to fixate (point their eyes) at a dot at the center of a
screen. Then a cue appeared for 54 ms, then an “inter-
stimulus  interval”,  then  a  Landolt  Square,  then  a
mask. (See the text for the purpose of the mask.) Note
that it takes 250 ms for eye movement to a new loca-
tion,  so  in  this  and  the  other  experiments  described
here  the  brief  presentations  of  stimuli  preclude  eye
movements to the cued items. I am grateful to Marisa
Carrasco for giving me this figure.
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imum size of a gap that could be detected by
about 35% compared to a gap on the opposite
side from the cue. That is, subjects could detect
much smaller gaps when they attended to the
area in which they appeared. 
The  conclusion  is  that  attention  affects
acuity. This is not part of the evidential basis
for the argument to come. However there is an-
other effect that is directly relevant to my argu-
ment: attention also causes the gap to be per-
ceived as larger. This was shown by a later type
of experiment from Carrasco’s lab.
The subjects were asked to fixate on the
dot that appeared for half a second (upper left
in Figure  6). Then the subjects saw a dot on
the left or a dot on the right or only at the fixa-
tion point in the center of the screen. Then the
subjects saw two Landolt squares each of which
could have a gap either on the top or the bot-
tom (even though the figure shows the gap on
the same side). The subject was then asked to
report whether the bigger of the two gaps is on
the top or the bottom. If the gap on the left
was bigger, the subject was supposed to report
the answer using the left pair of keys; mutatis
mutandis if the right gap is bigger. The subject
was told—correctly—that the dot did not pre-
dict anything about the size of the gaps. The
subjects’ instructions focus on the top/bottom
difference whereas what the experiment is really
about is the perceived size. The purpose of the
dot was to attract the subjects’ exogenous (in-
voluntary) attention to one side or the other on
some trials. What was being tested is whether
attention to, e.g., the left, would cause the per-
ceiver to treat the left gap as bigger. The result
was that it does. Subjects did not discriminate
between an attended .20o degree gap and an un-
attended .23o gap. (The gap sizes are measured
in degrees of visual angle. If a distance between
the eyes and the screen is specified, the degree
coding can be changed into inches.)10 Note that
subjects were not asked to judge relative sizes of
gaps. In particular they were not asked to judge
whether an attended .20o degree gap and an un-
attended .23o gap “look the same”. Rather, the
subjects  were  asked  to  make  discriminations
based on apparent gap size. The result is that
they are  indiscriminable.  And this  fact  about
these  experiments  has  led  to  disputes  about
what they really show, as I will explain.
The experiment diagrammed in Figure  5
shows attention increases acuity. This one shows
that attention makes gaps look bigger. One of
the  main  mechanisms by which  attention  im-
proves acuity is that attention shifts and shrinks
receptive  fields  (Anton-Erxleben &  Carrasco
2013). The shifting of receptive fields is prob-
ably involved in both the increase in acuity and
the larger appearance. Attention to an area of
space causes neurons that were not aiming at
that area of space to shift towards it. The effect
is  more  neurons  covering  that  area  of  space.
More neurons covering that area increases the
acuity of perception of it. And this mechanism
is responsible for the increase in apparent size
as  explained  by  Katharina Anton-Erxleben et
al. (2007).  Their  explanation  depends  on  the
“labeled-line”  hypothesis  that  neurons  in  the
10 This effect could be regarded as larger than the result from the Ye-
shurun and Carrasco paper reported in 5. In that paper, 75% accur-
acy was achieved by a .20o cued gap as compared with a .22o uncued
gap. That difference may be because the 75% accuracy is arbitrary.
Or if the difference is real, we could point to the fact that in the Go-
bell  and  Carrasco  study,  the  comparison  is  between  an  attended
square  and  a  square  from  which  attention  has  been  withdrawn,
whereas  in  the  Yeshurun  and  Carrasco  study  the  comparison  is
between a case in which something is cued and a case in which noth-
ing is cued. Note that there is no need for a mask in this experiment
since variations in iconic memory between subjects would be expec-
ted to affect equally both the square on the left and on the right.
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Figure  6:  Experiment from  Gobell &  Carrasco (2005).
Procedure described in text. Reproduced with permission
from Psychological Science.
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early visual system are hard wired to code for a
certain  area  of  space.  So  when  the  receptive
fields of neurons shift towards a target the brain
treats the size of the target as larger. 
5 Is the attentional effect perceptual?
There has been a controversy in the perception
literature  about  whether  the  kind  of  effect  I
have been describing is at least in part genu-
inely perceptual as opposed to an effect on the
decision process involved in generating a report
(Schneider &  Komlos 2008;  Valsecchi et  al.
2010). 
There probably are effects of attention on
aspects of decision, including on conceptualiza-
tion of a stimulus (Botta et al. 2014). However,
I think the case is overwhelming that the atten-
tional effect is at least in part genuinely percep-
tual.  One reason involves  “perceptual  adapta-
tion” a phenomenon known to Aristotle in the
form  of  the  “waterfall  illusion”.  As  Aristotle
noted, “...when persons turn away from looking
at objects in motion, e.g., rivers, and especially
those which flow very rapidly, things really at
rest  are  seen  as  moving”  (1955).  Looking  at
something  moving  in  a  direction  raises  the
threshold for seeing motion in that direction, bi-
asing the percept towards motion in the oppos-
ite direction. 
Perceptual  adaptation  is  involved  in  the
“tilt  aftereffect”.  If  one  looks  at  a  left-tilting
patch, the neural circuits for the left direction
raise  their  thresholds.  This  is  sometimes  de-
scribed  (evocatively  but  inaccurately—see
Anton-Erxleben et al. 2013) as neural fatigue.
Then when one looks at a vertical patch, it ini-
tially looks tilted to the right. (See Figure 6 of
Block 2010). The reason is that the neural cir-
cuits for rightward tilt dominate the percept be-
cause of the “fatigue” of the leftward tilt neur-
ons.  Ling &  Carrasco (2006) showed that  at-
tending to the adaptor increased the size and
duration of a variant of the tilt-aftereffect as if
the  contrast  of  the  adaptor  had  itself  been
raised.  Attending  to  a  70%  contrast  grating
ramped up the tilt after-effect as if the contrast
had been raised from 11 to 14% (different mag-
nitudes in different subjects). Ling and Carrasco
directed subjects  to attend to gratings for  16
seconds. They found a benefit of  attention at
first  in  allowing  subjects  to  distinguish  tilts,
since attention increases acuity, but then as ad-
aptation increased, discrimination of the adap-
ted tilt was impaired. This kind of adaptation is
ubiquitous in perception but does not appear to
occur in cognition or decision (Block 2014b). In
case anyone thought that the attentional effect
was entirely an effect on decision or cognition,
this experiment suggests otherwise.
But even apart from the adaptation res-
ults, there is strong evidence going back at least
to the 1990s from single cell recording in mon-
keys  and in  brain  imaging  for  the  conclusion
that attention increases  activity in the neural
circuits  responsible  for  the perception of  con-
trast in a manner roughly consonant with an in-
crease  in  the  perception of  contrast.  Much of
this evidence is summarized in sections 4.6 and
4.7  of  a  review  article  (Carrasco 2011).  My
hedge “roughly” stems from debates about the
exact effect of attention. There are two kinds of
“multiplicative” effects.  In “contrast gain” the
effect is just as if the contrast of the stimulus
has been multiplied by a constant factor. In “re-
sponse  gain”  the  response  is  multiplied  by  a
constant factor. The balance of these effects de-
pends on the difference between the size of the
target  and  the  size  of  the  “attentional  field”
(Herrmann et al. 2010). (These ideas are very
clearly explained in Chapter 2 of  Wu 2014.) A
further kind of  amplification effect is  additive
rather  than  multiplicative:  the  baseline  or
“floor”  level  of  activation in the circuit  is  in-
creased. There is some evidence (Cutrone et al.
in press) for increased input baseline as a major
part of the attentional effect.
Further, there is plenty of evidence for the
conclusion  that  attention  modulates  specific
cortical  circuits  depending  on  what  feature is
attended. A recent experiment (Emmanouil &
Magen 2014;  Schoenfeld et al. 2014) compared
brain  activation  when  subjects  attended  to  a
surface  on  the  basis  of  its  motion  and  when
subjects attended to a surface on the basis of its
color. Many of the stimuli involved both color
and motion but which feature was task relevant
was varied. The result was that motion sensitive
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areas of visual cortex were activated first when
motion  was  task  relevant  and  color  sensitive
areas of visual cortex were activated when color
was  task  relevant.  In  Carrasco’s  experiments,
subjects’ attention is drawn to the specific fea-
tures that the experiment concerns. In the ex-
periment diagrammed in Figure 6, subjects are
directed  to  report  the  location  of  the  bigger
gap, thereby directing attention to gap size. In
the analogous experiment connected with Fig-
ure 7, subjects are asked to report the tilt of the
patch that is higher in contrast, thereby direct-
ing attention to contrast.  In experiments con-
cerned with color saturation, subjects are shown
stimuli that vary in saturation and asked to re-
port the tilt of the patch that is higher in satur-
ation. Similarly for many other features—speed,
spatial frequency, flicker rate, motion coherence,
shape, brightness, etc. These instructions can be
expected  to  direct  attention  to  the  indicated
features with amplification in the circuits that
register those features. 
Schneider (2011) seems to think that when
subjects are asked to report on the side of the
larger gap and the gap on the attended side is .
20o while the gap on the unattended side is .23o,
the subject finds that there is no difference in
apparent  gap size  so  the subject  just  chooses
the more salient side. I will discuss salience in
the next section, but there is one thing about
this charge that raises a distinct issue: that sub-
jects register the increase in apparent size only
unconsciously. I now turn to that issue.
6 Is the attentional effect unconscious — 
like blindsight?
The experiments I  have described  are “forced
choice” experiments in which the subjects must
choose between two alternatives. In any percep-
tion  experiment  the  issue  can  be  raised  of
whether the perception is conscious or uncon-
scious, but the issue is often especially trouble-
some  in  forced  choice  experiments  with  brief
stimuli  in  which  subjects  make  a  conscious
choice but in which the stimuli are sufficiently
evanescent  that  subjects  do  not  get  a  really
good look at them (Phillips 2011). In addition,
the stimuli are presented very briefly, in the ex-
periments  described  above  for  80  ms  or  less.
Many  subjects  will  say  that  they  are  never
100% sure of anything. And this can lead to the
charge that what is really going on is akin to
“blindsight”  in  which  the  perception,  though
genuine, is unconscious (Turatto et al. 2007).
Why are the presentations so brief? Brief
presentations preclude eye movements, they pre-
clude  significant  perceptual  adaptation  (the
“neural  fatigue” that  causes afterimages),  and
they preclude certain kinds of strategic respond-
ing on the part of subjects. Further, it is known
that the effects of exogenous attention peak at
around 120 ms after the cue, so to maximize the
effects  of  exogenous  attention,  brief  presenta-
tions are required.
Massimo Turatto (2007) showed,  using a
procedure much like Carrasco’s with judgments
of perceived speed, that an unattended moving
patch was treated as equal in speed to an atten-
ded  moving  patch  that  was  slower  by  about
10%.  However  when  they  asked  subjects  for
subjective judgments of moving stimuli in peri-
pheral vision that really did differ in speed by
10%  (without  any  attentional  manipulation),
subjects  said  they  saw no  difference.  Turatto
took this as showing that the “just noticeable
difference”  between  the  items  being  distin-
guished is above the size of the attentional ef-
fect so the effect of attention on speed is not
conscious.  A  10%  difference  in  speed  is  well
above the differences that people can see con-
sciously  when  they  are  presented  for  longer
periods, but Turatto argues that for these short
presentations  the  just  noticeable  difference  is
larger—that is, it takes a larger difference to be
consciously perceived. 
There is a difficulty with his experimental
procedure though. There are well known prob-
lems in asking subjects for same/different judg-
ments. Whether the subjects say ‘same’ or ‘dif-
ferent’ depends not only on their percepts, but
also on their decision processes, including how
big an apparent difference has to be before they
regard it as reflecting reality. These issues are
nicely analyzed in (Anton-Erxleben et al. 2010,
2011).  When  Anton-Erxleben  et  al.  corrected
for these deficiencies in another same/different
experiment, they found effect sizes that are in
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the vicinity of other paradigms from the Car-
rasco lab. The effect size is slightly smaller but
as they note,  that is probably due to inferior
sensitivity  of  the  same/different  paradigm.
(Similar points apply to Kerzel et al. 2010.) One
of the conclusions I would draw is that the no-
tion of a “just noticeable difference” in its usual
applications is defective because noticeability is
not a perceptual property but rather the result
of an interaction between perception and cogni-
tion. I will not go into these issues further here.
However,  even  if  Turatto’s  methodology  is
flawed, the issue raised is a good one. How do
we know that  the effects  in  Carrasco’s  atten-
tional experiments are in fact conscious?
The stimulus in Figure 7 was one of the
stimuli  used  by  Carrasco  and  her  colleagues
(Carrasco et al. 2004) in the first experiment
that demonstrated that attention affects per-
ception  by  changing  the  qualities  of  percep-
tion, in this case increasing apparent contrast.
The method used was the same as described
earlier  in  connection  with  Figure  6—in  fact
this experiment was the model for the experi-
ment of Figure  6. Subjects were asked to re-
port the tilt of the patch that was higher in
contrast after their attention was attracted to
one side or the other by a dot as in Gobell &
Carrasco (2005). The result was that when the
22%  patch  was  attended  it  was  treated  by
subjects as the same in contrast as the less at-
tended  28%  patch.11 In  order  to  make  the
judgment,  subjects  were  shown  examples  of
higher  and  lower  contrast.  (Contrast  is  a
measure  of  the  difference  between  light  and
dark portions of a stimulus.) 
As I mentioned, similar experiments have
shown that attention increases apparent color
saturation, apparent size of a moving pattern,
apparent speed,  apparent  flicker  rate,  appar-
ent spatial  frequency (more about what that
is below), apparent motion coherence and ap-
parent time of occurrence—the attended event
seems to appear about 40 ms before the unat-
tended  event.  As  I  mentioned,  the  subjects
have  to  take  in  what  parameter  the  experi-
menter  is  talking  about—saturation,  spatial
frequency, gap size, contrast, etc. and then de-
cide which stimulus is greater  with respect to
11 As mentioned earlier, this methodology tells us that the two were in-
discriminable and it is a further step to conclude that they actually
look the same.
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Figure 7: A version of one of the stimuli used in (Carrasco et al. (2004). Fixate at the dot in the center and move your
attention to the left patch without moving your eyes. If you can manage that “covert attention”, the patches should
look to have about equal contrast. If you attend to where you are pointing your eyes (the center) you should be able to
visually appreciate that the right patch has higher contrast. I am grateful to Marisa Carrasco for supplying this figure.
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that parameter before they can answer the tar-
get  question  about  orientation  or  side  that
something is  on.  This  is  more complex than
any certified unconscious perception task that
I know of. Further there is positive evidence,
summarized  in  Stanislas Dehaene’s  recent
book  on  consciousness  (2014)  that  “[m]ulti-
step  calculations  will  always  require  a  con-
scious effort” (p. 95).
What further can be said about whether
the effect is conscious? I would be remiss if I
did not mention that when you look at a good
reproduction of the Carrasco stimuli (Figure 7)
you can just see the effect for yourself. (Don’t
stare  for  more  than  a  second  or  two  though
since adaptation will set in.) It can take a bit of
practice to learn to do “covert attention”, i.e.,
to  move  your  attention  without  moving  your
eyes though. (In my 2010 paper I included a fig-
ure, Figure 2 on p. 32, one of whose purposes
was to give the reader practice in covert atten-
tion.) Of course you have as much time as you
like  to  see  the  effect,  whereas  in  the  experi-
ments described you have very little time. Still,
what counts for the argument I am making is
the effect itself, not its timing. A further differ-
ence between just seeing the effect for yourself
and the experiments described is that they util-
ize different types of attention, endogenous for
your personal demonstration and exogenous in
the  experiments  described.  Endogenous  and
exogenous  attention have been  shown to  pro-
duce  roughly  comparable  effects  in  Carrasco’s
experiments,  though  in  some paradigms  some
exogenous attention is required for endogenous
attention to be efficacious (Botta et al. 2014).
I think many people are convinced of the
effect  because  they  can  just  experience  for
themselves. Not everyone can though as with al-
most any visual phenomenon. Of course we all
know the dangers of relying too heavily on in-
trospective judgments since they are easily ma-
nipulated.  There  is  a  line  of  experimentation
that addresses part of the issue.
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Figure 8: The sequence of events in (Chica et al. 2010) starting from the upper left. ITI = intertrial interval, ISI = in-
terstimulus interval, in this case the period between the offset of the cue and the onset of the stimulus. Reprinted by
permission of NeuroImage.
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Ana Chica and her colleagues (Chica et al.
2011;  Chica et al. 2010) have done a series of
experiments that directly address visibility.
The Chica et al. experiment (the 2010 ver-
sion) presents subjects with tilted patches that
are designed to be on the threshold of conscious
perception  and  subjects  were  explicitly  asked
whether they saw the target (after making an
orientation  judgment).  Subjects  were  strongly
encouraged  to  be  conservative  in  saying  they
saw the target.  They were supposed to avoid
“false  alarms”,  i.e.,  saying  there was a target
when there was no target, and they saw peri-
odic  messages  indicating  how  well  they  had
been doing in avoiding false alarms. In 25% of
the trials there was no target.
First subjects saw a fixation point inside
the middle of 3 boxes (pictured on the upper
left side of Figure 8), then there was a brief cue
consisting of a square around one of the boxes.
Then the target—a patch oriented either to the
right or the left—could appear for 16 ms (even
briefer  than in Carrasco’s  experiments).  Next,
subjects  had  to  indicate  by  pressing  keys—
within 2 seconds—which way the patch was ori-
ented.  They  had  to  choose  one  of  the  keys
whether  they saw something or  not,  i.e.,  this
was a “forced choice” experiment. Then they in-
dicated whether they saw the target or not. The
experimenters adopted a procedure—tailored to
each  subject’s  perceptual  abilities—to  make
sure the target was at the threshold of visibility
—for  that  subject.  They started  each  subject
with a patch of sufficiently high contrast to see
the stimulus. Every 16 trials they lowered the
contrast until the subject was not detecting at
least 25% of the patches (by the “Did you see
the  stimulus”  test).  If  the  percentage  of
avowedly seen patches went below 60%, they in-
creased the contrast.
The main result was that the proportion
of avowedly seen patches was much higher for
“validly cued targets,” i.e., when the cue was on
the box that had the patch than when the cue
was invalid, i.e., on the box on the opposite side
or neutral (when the cue was on the middle box
where no target ever appeared). In addition, the
reaction  time for  the cued patches  was  much
shorter  than for  uncued patches.  Chica  et  al.
also collected brain imaging data that suggested
unsurprisingly that the valid cues attracted at-
tention to the cued side, and more interestingly,
that when the subjects saw the patch despite
invalid cuing (i.e., the cue was on the opposite
side), the cue had often failed to attract atten-
tion.
This  experiment  suggests  that  attention
can affect whether a target is consciously visible
or not. The subjects were not probed, however,
on  the  issue  of  whether  they  actually  made
their judgments on the basis of the consciously
visible tilt. However, when subjects reported not
seeing the target, they were at chance on report-
ing the tilt. And when subjects reported seeing
the  tilt,  they  were  substantially  above  chance.
This is not the profile one sees in blindsight or
in  unconscious  priming  where  subjects  report
not seeing the stimulus at all; but more signific-
antly the tight relationship between consciously
seeing the stimulus and being able to judge the
tilt does suggest that they were reporting the
tilt on the basis of the conscious perception.
Chica’s  experiments  are  relevant  to  the
consciousness of Carrasco’s stimuli in another
way.  Chica’s  stimuli  were  presented  very
briefly:  16  ms  in  the  experiment  just  de-
scribed. Carrasco’s stimuli were presented for
longer, up to 100 ms in some experiments. In
addition, Chica’s contrasts were very low, as
befits stimuli that were supposed to be at the
threshold  of  visibility.  The  experiment  de-
scribed above does not report contrasts but in
other papers with somewhat more complex ex-
periments along the same lines (Botta et al.
2014;  Chica et  al. 2013),  the  contrasts  re-
quired for 50% detection were about 3%; high
detection seems to require up to 10% contrast.
In Carrasco’s  experiments,  much higher  con-
trasts are almost always used. I conclude that
the  reasons  against  the  “blindsight”  analogy
in  Chica’s  experiments  apply  even  more
strongly to Carrasco’s methodology. 
Given the high rates of conscious vision of
16 ms stimulus presentation even at lower con-
trasts than most of those used in Carrasco’s ex-
periments, I will ignore the issue of brevity of
stimulus presentations in the discussion to fol-
low. 
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Keith Schneider (2011,  2006;  Schneider &
Komlos 2008) has argued that Carrasco’s results
are  based  on  salience  rather  than  perceptual
variables  such as perceived contrast,  gap size,
flicker  rate,  spatial  frequency,  etc.  (Recently,
Schneider and Jake Beck have written a draft of
a paper on this topic. Rather than ascribe any
specific view to a paper in draft, I will discuss
the  issue  of  salience—stimulated  by  their  re-
marks—but from my own point of view.) I be-
lieve that the Carrasco lab is correct in their ex-
perimental  and  methodological  disagreement
with  Schneider  (Anton-Erxleben et  al. 2010,
2011), however it would be digressive for me to
discuss the issues involved in any detail here. I
believe though that it is possible to get some in-
sight without going into those issues. 
A  crude  version  of  a  salience  objection
treats salience as a “response bias” in the sense
of  a behavioral disposition to respond (in the
basic Carrasco paradigm illustrated in Figure 7)
by choosing the attended item. The idea is that
when  faced  with  a  choice  between  gaps,  the
subject is disposed to choose not the gap that
looks larger but rather the attended gap. This
account is ruled out by a control in many of the
Carrasco experiments of asking the subject to
report the properties of the smaller gap or the
patch that is  lower in contrast.  The attended
side is still boosted in apparent contrast or gap
size though the effect can be slightly smaller in
magnitude so there is a small effect of “response
bias” together with a main effect on perception.
Carrasco also  showed that  choosing the lower
contrast patch or smaller gap did not take any
extra time, ruling out a version of the behavi-
oral disposition objection that adds on an “in-
version of response”.
A more sophisticated salience objection al-
leges a “decision bias” in the sense of a post-
perceptual feature of  the cognitive process in-
volved in making a decision of how to respond.
All such accounts that I know of are ruled out
by the fact, mentioned above, that the effect is
substantially perceptual in nature. In addition,
Carrasco showed that the effect works for some
properties  but  not  others  (Fuller &  Carrasco
2006). As I have mentioned a number of times,
it works for saturation but not hue. Both exper-
iments involved a procedure like that in Figure
6. In the saturation version, subjects were asked
to report the tilt of the more “colorful” stimu-
lus, where the stimuli differed in color satura-
tion. In the hue version, subjects were asked to
report  the tilt  of  the “more bluish” stimulus,
where stimuli differed along a blue/purple con-
tinuum. The result: there is an attentional effect
on saturation but not hue. A cognitive decision
bias should equally affect both saturation and
hue. If the subjects are not aware of any differ-
ence in hue between the attended and unatten-
ded sides, it would seem that the “salience” per-
spective would say they would choose the atten-
ded side. But they don’t. Another possibility is
that the bias is perceptual in some way, say a
matter of perceptual prediction (Hohwy 2013).
In either case, the conclusion is that the effect
is substantially perceptual  and cannot be due
simply to any kind of a cognitive decision bias
toward choosing attended stimuli.
Whatever  understanding  of  salience  the
salience objection appeals to, salience must be
or be associated with a perceptual property, i.e.,
a property that is genuinely represented in vis-
ion. Some say (Prinz 2012) that the perceptual
properties that are involved in vision are limited
to a small set whose basic low level representa-
tions  are  products  of  sensory  transduction:
shape, spatial relations (including position and
size),  geometrical  motion,  texture,  brightness,
contrast and color. In other words, according to
this  “lean”  theory  of  perceptual  properties,
though we speak loosely of seeing something as
a face or as a case of causation, in reality see-
ing-as  is  limited  to  a  small  list  of  properties
that are the output of peripheral sense organs.
Others (Block 2014b;  Siegel 2010) argue for a
more  expansive  list  of  genuinely  perceptual
properties. 
How do we know which properties are per-
ceptual?  We  know  that  contrast,  size,  speed,
spatial frequency (roughly stripe density), etc.
are perceptual properties because they particip-
ate  in  perceptual  phenomena,  for  example  in
perceptual adaptation and perceptual popout. I
mentioned the waterfall illusion in which staring
at a moving stimulus makes a stationary item
seem to move in the opposite direction. And I’m
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sure every reader is familiar with color afterim-
ages.  Adaptation  is  a  ubiquitous  perceptual
phenomenon that can be used to show that size,
speed, stripiness, etc. are perceptual properties.
Note that I am not trying to define the notion
of a perceptual property in terms of …percep-
tion. The point rather is  that perception is a
natural kind and the perceptual nature of a rep-
resentation is revealed in participating in phe-
nomena in that kind (Block 2014b). By these
tests, for example, there is evidence that certain
face  and  facial  emotion-related  properties  are
perceptual. Viewers seeing an array of objects
including one face can pick out the face very
quickly on the basis of “parallel search”, just as
they can pick out a red object in a sea of green
objects. Similarly there are many adaptation ef-
fects for faces and facial expressions. 
Is  salience  a  perceptual  property  in  this
sense? Attention is important to both cognition
and perception,  but  attention  can  be  percep-
tual. In order to explain the effect of attention
on  increasing  the  duration  and  magnitude  of
the tilt  after-effect  (and the improvement fol-
lowed by impairment in discrimination) as de-
scribed earlier, the visual system would have to
track or register attention or where or what one
is attending to in addition to being affected by
attention. As I will explain in the next section,
there is an open question of whether the visual
system does much by way of tracking attention.
In discussions of salience there is often a
conflation  between  salience  as  a  perceptual
property and the genuine perceptual properties
that  are  involved  in  attracting  attention,  like
high contrast or speed or sudden changes in po-
sition. We commonly speak of a saliency map in
the sense of the map of locations in the visible
environmental layout in terms of whether they
are likely to attract attention. The perceptual
properties here do not involve salience itself but
rather differences with nearby locations in vis-
ible feature dimensions (Itti & Koch 2000), for
example in visible motion or appearance or dis-
appearance. People also speak of a saliency map
in the brain, meaning the increased activations
that correspond to attended areas. If salience is
supposed to be something other than attention
itself, that is If Beck and Schneider are giving
an explanation that is a genuine alternative to
Carrasco’s, they have to show that salience is
the  kind  of  perceptual  property  that  is  re-
gistered in the visual system and that can com-
bine in an additive fashion with contrast to af-
fect adaptation as in the tilt after-effect. I know
of absolutely no evidence for such a thing.
Many  sources  of  evidence  contribute  to
our  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  attention  in-
creases apparent contrast. John Reynolds et al.
have shown that attention boosts responses in
individual neurons in monkeys (2000). They de-
veloped a model of the mechanisms of this and
more complex effects involving multiple stimuli
(Reynolds &  Chelazzi 2004). Many brain-ima-
ging studies have shown similar effects. See sec-
tions  4.6  and  4.7  of  Carrasco (2011)  where
much of this work is summarized. At the beha-
vioral  level,  attention  increases  sensitivity
roughly as if contrast were increased and simil-
arly,  attention  can  mimic  the  effects  of  in-
creased  contrast  on making a stimulus visible
(as in the Chica experiment mentioned earlier).
And  as  mentioned  earlier,  attention  increases
adaptational  effects  as  if  contrast  were  in-
creased. Every result involving “salience” that I
have seen is just a redescription of effects of the
sort mentioned. 
Here is a way of seeing the emptiness of
appeals to salience: As mentioned earlier, at the
neural  level,  there  are  two  main  types  of  re-
sponse  functions  by  which  attention  increases
the firing rate of neurons, multiplicative and ad-
ditive.  I  mentioned a  recent  paper  that  com-
pares simulations of  neural  responses of  these
sorts to behavioral  data in order to ascertain
which of  the  types of  amplication  are mainly
being used by the visual  system. Though the
multiplicative models work pretty well, one ad-
ditive  model  works  very  well.  Thus  we  have
strong  evidence  for  the  functional  relation
between attention and the increase in contrast
responses in in the visual system. For simplicity,
let us focus on the multiplicative mechanisms:
In  multiplicative  gain,  the  response  of  the
neuron is multiplied by a constant factor. For
example, a neuron that responds to orientation
will give a large response to its preferred orient-
ation and a smaller response to other orienta-
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tions to the extent that they are distant from
the  preferred  orientation.  (For  example,  a
neuron that likes vertical lines will give a large
response to vertical lines.) Since multiplying a
larger number by a constant produces a larger
effect,  multiplicative gain is  most effective for
the preferred orientation. A second multiplicat-
ive response function is response gain in which
the sensitivity of the neuron is multiplied by a
constant factor. The effect is one of ratcheting
up the response to stimuli of every orientation.
The widely accepted normalization model of at-
tention (Reynolds & Heeger 2009) explains the
balance of these two mechanisms (and of addit-
ive gain) in terms of factors such as the relative
size of the target and the attentional field. The
attentional function of a given neuron can show
more multiplicative gain or more response gain
or  more  additive  gain  depending  on  these
factors. Here is my point. We can answer the
question of  what the difference between these
response functions is with respect to increasing
apparent  contrast.  For example,  multiplicative
gain increases  the apparent  contrast  more for
the preferred orientation and response gain in-
creases apparent contrast more for unpreferred
orientations. What is the answer to the corres-
ponding question for salience? Does multiplicat-
ive gain increase salience more for preferred or
unpreferred orientations? Is it the same as for
contrast? If so, then maybe “salience” is being
used as a synonym for contrast. A different an-
swer would be: multiplicative gain and response
gain are equally mechanisms of salience. In this
latter case it looks as if “salience” is just being
used to mean attention. To repeat the general
point: Those who advocate a “salience” explan-
ation of the phenomena have to show that there
is a property that is (1) perceptual, (2) not con-
trast and (3) acts in the ways indicated above.
Sometimes  the  issue  is  put  in  terms  of
“phenomenal salience” (Wu 2014). I think this
way of talking just muddies the waters. Percep-
tual  properties  can operate  in  both conscious
and unconscious perception. (At least: it would
be an amazing discovery that there is a percep-
tual property that only appears at the conscious
level.)  Attention—at least exogenous attention
—operates in unconscious perception in a sim-
ilar manner to conscious perception (Chica et
al. 2011;  Kentridge et al. 2008;  Norman et al.
2013). Further, it has recently been discovered
using optogenetic methods that top-down activ-
ation of  visual  area V1 is  about the same in
awake  and  anesthetized  mice  (Zhang et  al.
2014). This top-down activation involved feed-
back from a brain area in the mouse that cor-
responds  to  a locus  of  voluntary attention in
humans. If salience is a perceptual property, it
should be operative in unconscious perception.
So the salience issue is an issue about percep-
tion, not about just conscious perception.
The upshot is  that it is  not at all  clear
how  a  salience  objection  would  work,  so  the
burden is on those who advocate it to explain
it. I raised the issue of whether we are aware of
where  we  are  attending  in  connection  with
whether we are aware of salience, so I now turn
briefly to that question.
7 Are we aware of where we are and are
not attending?
There are a number of ways of approaching this
issue, none of them very satisfying. We are cer-
tainly aware of some aspects of voluntary atten-
tion—when  we  “pay  attention”  to  one  thing
rather  than another  (“endogenous attention”).
But much of attention is involuntary (“exogen-
ous”).  Any perceptibly sudden movement,  ap-
pearance  or  disappearance  or  sound  will  be
likely to attract exogenous attention. Subjects
in perceptual experiments can try to ignore sud-
den  movements  and  sounds  but  they  attract
exogenous attention nonetheless. Exogenous at-
tention ramps up more quickly (120 ms vs 300
ms) and dies off more quickly. Eye movements
can also be voluntary or involuntary. Awareness
of where the eyes are pointing is a rough index
of awareness of attention. There is some evid-
ence that people are not very aware of the time
and direction of their “saccades”, the quick bal-
listic  eye  movements that  occur  when we are
visually exploring our environment. Heiner Deu-
bel et al. showed that subjects seem to “have no
explicit  knowledge  about  their…eye  position”
and often don’t “notice the occurrence of even
large  saccadic  eye  movements”  (1999,  p.  68).
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However,  this  is  not  conclusive  evidence  that
they don’t know where they are attending since
they may confuse movement of attention with
movements of the eyes. And the visual system
could track attention even if  subjects  are not
aware of where they are attending. 
Perhaps more illumination can be achieved
from  work  on  the  “landscape  of  attention”
(Datta & DeYoe 2009). Brain imaging shows a
complex rapidly shifting map of spatial atten-
tion in the visual system. Spatial attention can
be “focused” at one location even though there
is  almost  as  much  attention  at  a  number  of
other locations and some attention throughout
half the visual field. The attentional field often
has a “Mexican hat” shape with amplification
at the center surrounded by a ring of inhibition
and  then  an  increase  outside  that  ring.  Cer-
tainly no one is aware of all that dynamic detail
though I have been unable to find any specific
study addressing the issue. I think it is safe to
say that in normal perception there is no phe-
nomenology that specifies much of the detail of
where  one  is  and  is  not  attending—nor  how
much one is attending. So any attempt to ex-
plain  Carrasco’s  results  that  appeals  to  our
awareness of where we are attending takes on
the burden of showing that we do have suffi-
ciently fine-grained awareness of where we are
attending.
8 Veridicality and representationism
In Carrasco’s experiments, an attended .20o gap
is not discriminated from an “unattended” .23o
gap. I think the best conclusion is that atten-
tion changes perceived size and contrast. (Recall
that I am talking about spatial attention rather
than attention to a property instance or an ob-
ject.) Do the gaps just fail to look different or
do they look the same? 
In Carrasco’s main paradigm, subjects are
forced  to  choose  which  stimulus  is  bigger  (or
faster or higher in contrast). In the case of an
attended .20o gap as compared with an “unat-
tended” .23o gap, subjects are as likely to choose
one option as the other. In this sense these op-
tions  are  not  discriminable.  However,  I  men-
tioned  that  when  subjects  are  asked  instead
whether the items are the same or different, the
effect of attention is slightly smaller. And that
may suggest that there is substantive daylight
between not looking different and looking the
same.  (Of  course  this  difference  matters  very
much in some contexts,  for  example,  as men-
tioned earlier,  the  context  of  the  phenomenal
Sorites issue;  Morrison 2013.)  As I mentioned
earlier; Anton-Erxleben et al. and her colleagues
argue persuasively that the smaller effect is due
to  the  same/different  paradigm  being  a  less
sensitive measure (2011). In what follows I will
assume  that  the  attended  .20o gap  looks  the
same in respect of size as the “unattended” .23o
gap.
I put the “unattended” in quotes because I
mean no commitment to the improbable claim
that there is no attention on the .23o gap. There
is no agreement on whether there can be con-
scious  perception  or  even  unconscious  percep-
tion with zero spatial attention or whether zero
spatial attention is even possible.12 Indetermin-
acy in our concept of attention may even make
this an unanswerable question. Still, I will ad-
opt the abbreviatory convention of referring to
stimuli that are not focally attended as “unat-
tended”.
Since the apparent size of the gap differs
depending on where one is attending, the ques-
tion arises as to which of these various percepts
of  the gap gets  its size  right (or most nearly
right) and which gets its size wrong (or most
nearly wrong). Veridicality is a matter of get-
ting things right and veridicality in perception
is a matter of the world being as it appears to
be. There would be no good reason to decide
that the veridical percept of the gap is one in
which one is attending to a spot one inch away
from it; why pick one inch rather than one cen-
timeter? (Recall that the attentional landscape
of amplification and inhibition varies from place
to  place  and from moment  to  moment.)  The
most obvious candidate for a non-arbitrary an-
swer to the question is: the veridical percept of
the gap (if there is any veridical percept) is the
one in which one is attending to the gap itself. 
12 Spatial attention does not require feature-based attention or atten-
tion to an object. See  Wayne Wu’s book on some of these issues
(2014).
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I think of veridicality as all or none, but
for the sake of  accommodating different opin-
ions I can countenance degrees of  veridicality.
One innocuous use of such a phrase is that if
one represents a .19o gap as .20o, the percept is
more veridical than if one represents it as .21o.
Also  we could  say that  other  things  equal,  a
percept that attributes a higher probability of
being .21o to a .21o gap is more veridical.
But  once  it  is  stated  that  the  most
veridical percept of the gap is one in which one
is attending to the gap, one wonders why one
should believe this hypothesis rather than the
opposite hypothesis  that  attention  distorts  by
magnifying, illusorily, for the purpose of getting
information and that the attended item is seen
illusorily. Is the perception of the gap with less
attention really illusory in the sense of a dis-
crepancy between stimulus and perception? 
In  an  article  on  Carrasco’s  discovery,
Stefan Treue (2004, p. 436) says this:
In  summary,  this  study provides  convin-
cing  support  for  an  attentional  enhance-
ment of stimulus appearance. It completes
a  triangle  of  converging  evidence  from
electrophysiology, functional brain imaging
and  now  psychophysical  findings,  which
argues  that  attention  not  only  enhances
the processing of attended sensory inform-
ation but manipulates its very appearance.
…attention turns out to be another tool at
the visual system’s disposal to provide an
organism with an optimized representation
of the sensory input that emphasizes relev-
ant details, even at the expense of a faith-
ful representation of the sensory input. (it-
alics added)13
I quote Treue not because I agree with him but
in order to get a statement of that view on the
table. There is no sufficient reason to accept the
view that an attended perception of a gap al-
lows us to see it as it really is rather than the
view that attention in perception is like a mag-
nifying glass,  distorting for informational pur-
13 Carrasco (Carrasco et al. 2008, p. 1162) has been interpreted as agreeing
with Treue by Stazicker (2011a) and Watzl (forthcoming). Carrasco tells
me she did not mean to endorse the Treue view.
poses at the cost of illusion. I can imagine con-
siderations that might incline one towards ad-
opting one or the other of these positions—that
attention  falsifies  or  that  attention  “veridical-
izes”—but the adoption would be for purposes
of one or another kind of utility, not as a prin-
cipled reason to think that the highest degree of
veridicality is really to be found in that case.
The  challenge  is  to  find  a  principled
reason for regarding seeing a thing or place with
a  certain  degree  of  attention  to  be  more
veridical than seeing it with a different degree
of attention. Sufficiently decreasing attention to
something can move the perception below the
threshold of visibility. But not seeing something
that is too small to see or to faint to see need
not be a matter of illusion.
Chris Hill (in conversation) and Sebastian
Watzl (forthcoming) have argued that there is
an  optimal  level  of  attention  and  perception
with all other values engender illusion. Watzl’s
version of this view appeals to the idea that the
function of attention is to make perceptual rep-
resentations usable—as opposed to the function
of  perception  of  veridically  representing  the
world.  These functions will  conflict  in normal
circumstances.  The  optimal  level  of  attention
for fulfilling the function of perception—veridic-
ality—will be achieved in an idealized scenario
of  no  attention,  or  one  of  equal  attention  to
everything. This is an interesting point of view,
but is  contradicted by the point made earlier
that veridicality conditions require a history of
veridical representation.
Epistemicists about vagueness think that
there can be an unknowable fact of the matter
as  to  a  sharp  border  between  bald  and  not
bald, a number of hairs that a bald man can
have  even  though  adding  a  single  hair  will
make the man not bald. But if there can be a
fact about a border even though there could
be no principled reason to regard any particu-
lar border as the real one, why can’t there be
a  fact  about  what  degree  of  attention  en-
genders veridicality that no one could have a
principled  reason  to  accept?  Epistemicists
should not regard the cases as analogous since
they think there is a principled reason to hold
there is a fact about a border and a principled
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explanation  for  our  ignorance  (Sorenson
2013).
It  may  be  objected  that  there  is  good
reason  to  accept  Treue’s  point  of  view  since
after all, attention to the .20o gap makes it look,
illusorily,  to  be  the  same  size  as  the
unattended .23o gap. But why not blame the il-
lusion  on  the  percept  of  the  unattended  gap
rather than the attended gap? One can blame
the mismatch, but that does not help in decid-
ing whether attention to an individual item en-
genders veridicality or illusion. I think the issues
are  clearer  when  one  avoids  the  comparative
perception and just asks, say of the situation in
Figure 5, whether perception of the gap can be
veridical when it is cued and one is attending to
it or when it is not cued and one is attending
elsewhere. There is no adequate justification for
one answer over the other. Some may wish to
abandon the notion of veridicality as applied to
perception but that would be to abandon the
notion of representational content as applied to
perception  and  so  to  abandon  representation-
ism. The representational content of a percep-
tion is—constitutively— the veridicality condi-
tions. There is a strong a priori case for percep-
tual  representation  (Siegel 2010).  And in  any
case the science of  perception makes essential
use of veridicality (Burge 2010).
In  the  discussion  of  the  analogous  issue
with  regard  to  inhomogeneities  in  the  visual
field, I noted that the sort of differences in per-
ception  caused  by  spatial  inhomogeneities  are
paralleled  by  differences  due  to  temporal  in-
homogeneities—that  is  variation  from  percept
to percept due to random factors. Any two per-
cepts of the same items at the same point in the
visual field with the same degree of attention
are  likely  to  differ  in  apparent  contrast  (and
other properties) due to these random factors.
It is hard to see a rationale for treating spatial
inhomogeneities  differently  from  temporal  in-
homogeneities and it is hard to see a rationale
for treating either of them differently from the
inhomogeneities due to distribution of attention.
Claiming that all engender illusion would make
most perception illusory.
We  are  considering  the  question  of
whether the veridical percept of the gap is the
attended  one  or  the  unattended  one.  But  is
there a well formed question here? Is it endo-
genous attention that counts? Or exogenous at-
tention? We are talking about spatial attention
but what if feature-based or object based atten-
tion goes counter to spatial attention? That is,
one can be attending to a place but also to a
property that is instantiated in another place.
And is it the absolute or relative value of spa-
tial attention that matters? That is, is it some
absolute attentional value or is it the most at-
tended place that is seen veridically? Talking on
a fake cell phone drains away spatial attention,
causing the subjects to miss seeing objects in
the centers of their  visual fields (Scholl et al.
2003). (Scholl et al. used a fake cell phone to
avoid  the  unnecessary  source  of  variability  of
features of the responses from the other end of
the line.) If it is absolute value that counts then
when talking on a fake cell phone (and presum-
ably a real one too), all vision would be illusory.
That is a conclusion that we would have to have
some very good reason to accept.14
One caution: I am speaking oversimply in
a number of respects in asking whether atten-
tion engenders  veridicality or  illusion.  I  men-
tioned  the  issue  of  whether  veridicality  is
graded. And there is an independent issue of
relativity  to  what  property  one  is  talking
about. In the experiment pictured in Figure 5,
14 It may be thought that the issue of which percept is veridical is
avoided by forms of direct realism that hold that there are no
perceptual illusions. For example, Bill Brewer holds that in the
Müller-Lyer  illusion  (so  called)  in  which  lines  of  the  same
length look to be of different lengths, what one is seeing is a re -
semblance between the situation in front of one’s eyes and what
he calls a paradigm of different lengths. The idea is that that is
what equal lines look like when surrounded by opposite–facing
arrowheads. And the way equal lines look in that circumstance
is like pairs of unequal lines one has seen. On this form of dir -
ect realism, the “illusion” to the extent that one can speak of
such a thing is in the mistaken inference that the lines in front
of  one’s  eyes  are  of  different  lengths.  They  resemble  pairs  of
lines of unequal lines but one should not conclude that they are
unequal. 
However, Brewer requires differentiating between cases in which
one sees a property instantiated before one’s eyes that is not a
resemblance  to  something  unseen  and  the  cases  in  which  one
sees a resemblance. In effect, the cases in which one sees a re -
semblance  to  something  unseen  is  a  pseudo-illusion  category
that he has to recognize. So the question arises of whether this
pseudo-illusion arises in the case of attention or in the case of
the lack of it. That is, is one seeing a resemblance to a non-ex-
istent  thing  when  one  attends  or  when  one  does  not  attend?
And this is an unanswerable question for the reasons explored
in this section.
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the attended percept is certainly more likely to
be  veridical  in  respect  of  which  side  of  the
square the gap is on. And in the experiment
pictured in Figure  6, the comparative percept
—that is, the percept of the comparative size
between the right and the left is distorted by
attention to one side and improved by atten-
tion to the fixation point. So veridicality is cer-
tainly affected by attention—though in differ-
ent ways for different properties. The question
I am asking about gap size is whether a single
gap is perceived more—or on the contrary, less
— veridically if it is attended. More generally,
there are certain properties—I have mentioned
size, contrast, color saturation and others—for
which attention to an individual item changes
appearance  of  that  property.  Which  is  more
veridical,  the  pre-change  or  post-change  ap-
pearance?
One  might  think  that  there  is  a  simple
way to  get  at  the  issue  of  whether  attention
magnifies, illusorily, for the purposes of getting
information, or whether attention makes things
look more as they really are. You could just ask
people how contrasty a patch is or how big a
gap is and then consider whether those answers
correspond better to reality when perception is
attentive or inattentive. But the human ability
to make such absolute judgments for at  least
some relevant  dimensions  is  remarkably  poor,
certainly  orders  of  magnitude worse  than our
ability  to  discriminate  stimuli  (Chirimuuta &
Tolhurst 2005a). In particular, the uncertainty
of absolute identification (absolute in the sense
of the ability to say what the contrast is in per-
centage terms) is far larger than the effects of
attention. Even if there were some sort of stat-
istical advantage or disadvantage to conditions
of attention in estimating contrast or gap size
one would have to ask whether the advantage
could  be  ascribed  to  better  perception  or  to
better inference from a percept that did not dif-
fer in veridicality.
I will assume in what follows that atten-
ded and unattended perception  can both  be
veridical.  Considerations  of  the  same  sort
mentioned here also apply to the veridicality
of  perception  in  both  the  upper  and  lower
visual field.
9 Indeterminate contents and the 
phenomenal precision principle
As I mentioned, an attended .20o gap looks the
same size as an unattended .23o gap. Of course
the comparative percept—the gaps looking the
same—is illusory. But what about the percepts
of each gap, considered separately? Is the per-
cept of  the attended .20o gap illusory? Is the
percept of the unattended .23o gap illusory? I
argued that we would need a better reason than
we have to suppose that one but not the other
is illusory. And I claimed that we should not
suppose  that  both  are  illusory.  The  option  I
have argued for is that both are (or rather can
be  in  normal  circumstances)  veridical.  As  I
mentioned, the simplest perceptual representa-
tions contain two elements, a singular element
that represents an individual item and a percep-
tual  “attributive”  in  Burge’s  terminology that
attributes  a  property  to  that  individual  item
(2010). In the gap-size case, the perceptual at-
tributive  attributes  sizes  to  gaps.  A  veridical
percept attributes a size to a gap only if  the
gap has that size.  In order for the attributed
property to apply to both gaps, that property
will have to be “intervalic”, i.e., a somewhat im-
precise property—for example, the property of
being within the range of .20o to .23o (inclusive
of  endpoints).  Since  both  gaps  are  in  that
range, both percepts are veridical (in respect of
gap size).
Perhaps a probabilistic treatment of these
ranges of values is in order? But how can one
justify one probability distribution rather than
another  without  making  assumptions  about
whether the attended gap is seen more veridic-
ally than the unattended gap? For example, to
say that the unattended percept of the .nno gap
represents  the  gap  as  most  likely  to  be  .nno,
whereas  the  attended  percept  represents  the
same  gap  as  most  likely  to  have  some  other
value  is  to  regard  the  unattended percept  as
more  veridical  than  the  attended  percept.  A
probabilistic treatment would perhaps pass the
sufficient reason test though if the same probab-
ility were attributed to both ends of the range. 
It will be useful to move back to the ex-
ample of contrast. The data portrayed in Figure
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7 comes from the bottom right of Figure 9. Fig-
ure 9 contains four comparisons, each of which
is keyed to one of the four little squares between
the patches. If one fixates on one of the squares,
the patch to the left of the square attended is
the same in apparent contrast as the patch on
the right  unattended.  The 22% patch can be
unattended—in which case it has the same ap-
parent contrast as the 16% patch when it is at-
tended, or the 22% patch can be attended in
which case it has the same apparent contrast as
the 28% patch when it is unattended. So differ-
ent veridical percepts of  the 22% patch could
represent it as the same as patches that are 6%
more or 6% less in contrast. 
Consider  the  contrast  phenomenology  of
an  attended  percept  of  the  22% patch.  That
phenomenology is the same as the phenomeno-
logy of a 28% patch unattended. Assuming that
there  is  not  normally  a  phenomenology  that
specifies what one is and is not attending to, a
matter discussed above in section  7—the phe-
nomenology of a 22% patch attended does not
carry the information of whether it is the phe-
nomenology of a percept of a 22% patch or of a
28% patch. So in order for both percepts with
that phenomenology to be veridical, the repres-
entational content would have to be at a min-
imum 22%-28% (inclusive of 22% and 28%).
However, there is a determinate difference
in phenomenology between percepts of the 22%
patch and the 28% patch when serially fixated
and attended as you can verify by looking at
Figure  9.  (There are larger  differences of  this
sort to be described later and as I mentioned in
section  3,  inhomogeneities  in  the  visual  field
produce larger differences of this sort.) I believe
that this determinate difference is appreciable if
one  moves  one’s  attention  while  fixating  the
little square but the difference is even more ob-
vious if one moves fixation as well as attention.
The 22% and 28% patches look determin-
ately different if one is attending to and foveat-
ing (looking right at) each in turn. So if repres-
entationism is true, there can be veridical rep-
resentational  contents  of  22%-28% only if  the
phenomenal  precision  of  the  percepts  of  the
patches seen attended and foveated is narrower
than the phenomenal precision of at least one of
the percepts seen in the periphery with only one
attended. This is a version of what I called the
phenomenal precision principle in section  2. If
two  things  look  the  same  (veridically)  when
seen in peripheral vision with at least one unat-
tended, but the same two things look determin-
ately different—also veridically— when seen fo-
veally  and  attentively,  then  the  phenomenal
precision  of  the  attended  and  foveal  percepts
must be narrower than at least one of the prior
percepts. And we can guess that it is the unat-
tended prior percept that has to be less precise.
Recall that perceptual representations that
are imprecise in that they attribute ranges can
still be fine-grained. Suppose for example that a
percept attributes a broad range of sizes to a
gap of .10o-.50o. That is a different representa-
tional content from .11o-.51o, and that is differ-
ent from .12o-.52o.  So our ability to see small
differences can be based on absolute representa-
tion even if perception is imprecise. But if the
representational contents of the foveal percepts
almost totally overlap, as with .11o-.51o .12o-.52o,
how  could  those  representational  contents
ground the determinately different phenomeno-
logies?
Consider  an  analog  for  inattentive  peri-
pheral perception of color in which there is  a
red patch on one side and a blue patch on the
other  and  the  subject  fixates  in  the  middle.
Suppose—and as far as I know this is science
fiction—that there is some distribution of atten-
tion such that the two patches seen briefly and
inattentively in the periphery can look the same
and look red-blue and have the representational
content red-blue. I don’t mean reddish blue. I
mean indeterminate as between central red and
central blue or in between. They could be red,
they could be blue, or they could be in between.
Since  attentive  foveated  percepts  of  red  and
blue in normal conditions are determinately dif-
ferent from one another (and from other colors)
in phenomenology, the representational contents
of red and blue seen foveated, attentively (and
leisurely), would have to be more precise than
the  supposed  contents  seen  peripherally,  inat-
tentively (and briefly).  Otherwise there would
be  increasing  precision  in  phenomenology
without increasing precision in representational
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content  and  representationism  cannot  allow
that. 
In  short,  representationism  requires  that
inattentive peripheral perception be less precise
representationally than attentive and foveal per-
ception.
Now here is the striking fact: there is evid-
ence  that  peripheral  inattentive  perception  of
many  properties  is  not  less  representationally
precise  than  foveal  attentive  perception.  This
conclusion conflicts with the application of the
phenomenal precision principle to the cases at
hand. I have already discussed the peripheral vs
foveal aspect of  this  point and I will  go over
some of the evidence for the attentional com-
ponent in section 11 below.
I will explain the argument just sketched
in more detail. But first I must discuss a piece
of the puzzle, the notion of a just noticeable dif-
ference.
10 Just noticeable differences
A ubiquitous feature of perception is that per-
ceptual discrimination is more fine-grained than
perceptual identification. Even those with abso-
lute pitch can identify perhaps 100 pitches (de-
pending  on  exactly  how  absolute  pitch  is
defined), but can discriminate many thousands
of  pitches  from one  another  (Raffman 1995).
Those  who have  absolute pitch are  no better
than other musically literate people in pitch dis-
crimination (Levitin 2005, 2008). Given the dis-
parity between identification and discrimination
one might wonder whether our ability to make
fine grained perceptual discriminations misleads
us as to the precision of our perceptual repres-
entations. It certainly seems to us that each of
those thousands of pitches has a distinct phe-
nomenology  but  maybe  that  judgment  feeds
more off  of  the phenomenology of  discrimina-
tion of differences than off of the phenomeno-
logy of individual pitches.
I have argued that the phenomenology of
perception does not allow for a large degree of
imprecision.15 I appealed to the “just noticeable
difference” of contrast of 2%. I said:
The representationist may retort that the
point is not that the contents are fuzzy or
represented indeterminately but that they
are abstract relative to other contents, as
determinables are to determinates, for ex-
ample as red is to scarlet. But this line of
thought runs into the following difficulty:
the variation of 6% due to attention is way
above  the  ‘just  noticeable  difference’
threshold, which for stimuli at these levels
is approximately 2%. (Or so I am told. In
any  case,  just  looking  at  the  stimuli  in
Figure  4  [Figure  9 here]  shows that  the
difference  is  easily  detectable.  And  you
may recall that in the discussion of the tilt
aftereffect,  there  was  evidence  that  at
higher levels of contrast, the increase due
to  attention  was  as  much as  14%.)  The
point is that there is no single ‘look’ that
something has if it is 22% plus or minus
6% in contrast. By analogy, consider the
supposition  that  something  looks  as  fol-
lows: rectangular or triangular or circular.
That  disjunctive  predicate  does  not  de-
scribe one way that something can look—
at least not in normal perceptual circum-
stances (Block 2010, p. 52).
Jeremy Goodman (2013) has criticized my reas-
oning. He says:
15 In  Block (2010).  Actually,  I  spoke  of  “indeterminacy”  and—mis-
takenly—of “vagueness” of perception.
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Figure 9: If one maintains fixation on one of the 4 little
squares while varying attention to the patches on either
side of the square, the patch to the left of the square seen
with attention has the same appearance as the patch to
the right without attention. I am grateful to Marisa Car-
rasco for this figure.
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Ned  Block,  when  considering  the  hypo-
thesis that perceptual appearances are ‘ab-
stract  relative  to  other  contents,  as  de-
terminables  are  to  determinates,  for  ex-
ample  as  red  is  to  scarlet’,  objects  that
‘the  variation  of  6% due to  attention  is
way above the “just noticeable difference”
threshold, which for stimuli at these levels
is approximately 2%’ (p. 35).
Goodman goes on to speak of “Block’s objec-
tion that our discrimination thresholds place an
upper bound on the unspecificity of perceptual
appearances…” (2013, p. 35). Although it may
have  sounded  that  way,  I  did  not  intend  to
claim  that  discrimination  places  an  upper
bound on either representational or phenomenal
imprecision. But I think that a certain kind of
discrimination is relevant to both imprecisions
as I will explain. 
An ability to discriminate between two ob-
servable magnitudes does not prove that one’s
percepts  of  the magnitudes actually  differ  (in
either  representational  content  or  phenomeno-
logy).  One example that I have used to illus-
trate this point (Block 2007, p. 540) is the phe-
nomenon of “beats” (alternating soft and loud
sounds) caused by interference between guitar
strings  of  very  slightly  different  pitches  even
when  the  two  pitches  are  phenomenally  the
same on their own. (The frequency of beats in
response to two pure pitches is the difference in
frequencies.) Another is the color border effects
that allow one to see that two colors are differ-
ent even when the colors themselves would not
be distinguishable if separated slightly. Even for
achromatic objects, slight differences are ampli-
fied by a well known border phenomenon that is
responsible for the famous “Mach Bands” illu-
sion. Goodman uses the example of  two trees
that look to have slightly different heights be-
cause of how far they stick up above the tree
canopy. His point is that vision might represent
overlapping but slightly different intervalic val-
ues, but one could also use the example to illus-
trate  heights  that  don’t  look  at  all  different
when seen separately while nonetheless allowing
one to see a difference when seen next to one
another. 
It  is  intuitive to think that the way the
visual  system detects  differences  between  one
thing and another is by registering the proper-
ties  of  each  thing  separately  and  comparing
those registrations. But this is not always the
case: Differences are often detected via different
processes  than the processes  that  register  the
entities or properties that differ. Beats are pro-
duced by interference between two sound waves,
allowing  one  to  detect  differences  between
sounds that would otherwise be inaudible. 
As the examples just given illustrate, dis-
crimination may be possible without any differ-
ence  in  the  phenomenology  of  the  individual
percepts.  Two  pitches  can  be  indiscriminable
even if one knows they differ because of beats.
However, there is no reason to think that spe-
cialized discrimination mechanisms are at work
in  the  experiments  described.  Specialized  dis-
crimination mechanisms can be expected to de-
pend on the specific features of the perceptual
situations and so not robust to changes in the
situation of the perception. For example, if you
change your angle of view you might see the full
vertical length of the trees but not their differ-
ential protrusion above the canopy. Border con-
trast effects are fragile—move the color samples
just a bit apart and the effect vanishes. (This is
nicely  illustrated  in  the  Wikipedia  entry  for
“Mach Bands”.) However, the attentional effects
I have been talking about apply to color, speed,
size  of  a  moving  object,  spatial  frequency
(stripe density), time of occurrence, flicker rate,
motion  coherence  (the  extent  to  which  many
moving items are going in the same direction),
as well as to contrast and gap size. What is the
chance that there is some specialized discrimin-
ation method at work for all these magnitudes?
Most impressively, these effects can be exhibited
in  visual  short  term  memory—that  is,  they
don’t  even  require  simultaneous  perception.
This was shown by Martin Rolfs & Marisa Car-
rasco using a different  experimental  paradigm
than the ones so far discussed (2012; Rolfs et al.
2013). I won’t describe it except to say that the
patches are compared in respect of contrast by
comparing a patch seen earlier with a currently
seen  patch,  and  with  similar  results  to  those
already described. As I mentioned in section 3,
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a  similar  experiment  shows  that  a  perceived
patch at one location in the visual field can be
compared with a remembered patch at a differ-
ent location with results that show the inhomo-
geneities in the visual field (Montaser-Kouhsari
&  Carrasco 2009). The likelihood that there is
some method of comparison that does not de-
pend on the individual percepts themselves but
survives all these variations does seem slight. 
So the kind of discrimination that is not
based  on  specialized  mechanisms  of  detecting
differences independently of registering absolute
value can be used to make a better case.
But even if we can make very fine grained
discriminations  and  even  if  the  percepts  in-
volved  in  the  discriminations  are  distinct,  it
does not follow that the percepts are not highly
imprecise—as mentioned earlier. Suppose for ex-
ample, that perceptions of contrast are so im-
precise as to cover nearly all the range of con-
trasts. Consider a representation of contrast of
4%-98%.  Still,  4.1%-98.1%  would  be  another
equally  imprecise  content  that  is  nonetheless
distinct from the first one. And so more gener-
ally discriminability has little in the way of im-
mediate consequences for imprecision. 
The notion of a just noticeable difference
is not very useful for my purposes. Discrimina-
tion can be finer than absolute registration as in
the case of beats. And strong ability to discrim-
inate is compatible with a high degree of impre-
cision. Further, the notion of a just noticeable
difference combining as it does, perception with
cognition, allows the possibility of a difference
in conscious percepts that is not cognitively ac-
cessible.
11 Absolute representation 
The phenomenal precision principle tells us that
if the phenomenology of perception is grounded
in its representational content, then peripheral
unattended perception must be more imprecise
than foveal attended perception. This result ap-
plies  to  contrast,  size,  spatial  frequency  and
some other  properties  but  not  location.  How-
ever, experimental results to be described in the
next section suggest that contrast perception is
as  precise  in foveal  attended perception as in
peripheral  unattended  perception.  But  what
this  evidence  does  not  tell  us  is  how  precise
they both are, i.e., whether both are relatively
precise or relatively imprecise. 
I  mentioned  a  study  by  Mazviita
Chirimuuta &  David Tolhurst (2005a) that is
relevant  to  the  issue  of  how  precise  absolute
representations of contrast are in foveal atten-
ded perception. Chirimuuta and Tolhurst have a
behavioral result that shows that performance
in classifying contrasts falls off sharply after 4
contrasts. They have a neural model of contrast
identification  that  suggests  that  the  brain  is
capable of representing only 4-5 contrasts and
that  this  limit  is  compatible  with  very  fine-
grained  discriminations.  Chirimuuta’s  view  is
that the response probabilities in the visual sys-
tem for contrasts are very broad, with the tails
of every distribution covering much of the span
of possible contrasts. (That is, there is a non-
zero probability across almost the whole range
of contrasts.) Contrasts can only be identified
when the response is near the peak of the prob-
ability  distribution  but  two  responses  can  be
compared  when  responses  are  in  the  tails  so
long as the tails do not overlap much.
I’ll  start  with the behavioral  result.  She
presented subjects with a number of patches of
up to 8 grades of contrast that were labeled “1”
through “8” in each sequence of trials. Subjects
looked at the contrasts and labels for as long as
they liked and could have a refresher any time
in  the  midst  of  the  experiment  if  they liked.
They had to hold the pairs of digits and con-
trasts in working memory and assign numbers
to contrast stimuli. Then, patches were presen-
ted for half a second and subjects had to try to
give the digit label. Performance was good up
to 4 items and fell off drastically for larger sets. 
Performance on 4 contrasts was near per-
fect. Then when new contrasts outside the ori-
ginal  range  were  added,  performance  fell  off,
even for the original 4 contrasts. This is a pat-
tern often seen in working memory experiments.
For example, wild monkeys participated in an
experiment  in  which  an  experimenter  sets  up
two buckets and ostentatiously places, one at a
time,  a  number  of  pieces  of  apple  in  each
bucket. For example, there might be 4 in one
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bucket and 3 in the other. The result is that for
numbers of slices of 4 or less, monkeys reliably
go to the bucket with more but with more than
4 items, performance falls off to chance (Barner
et al. 2008; Hauser et al. 2000). Human infants
show  similar  results  with  a  limit  closer  to  3
(Feigenson et al. 2002). 
The number 4 figures in working memory
experiments in which subjects are asked to re-
member digits but are given another simultan-
eous distraction task to prevent overt strategies
of  “chunking”  digits  into  units.  Subjects  can
typically remember about 4 digits.  In  a com-
pletely  different  paradigm,  George Sperling
showed subjects a grid of letters briefly (1960).
Subjects often said they could continue to see
all  or  almost  all  the  items  faintly  after  the
patch  disappeared.  (This  kind  of  image  has
been called a visual “icon”.) When the grid had
3 rows of 4 items, and subjects were asked to
recite as many letters as they could, they could
name 3-4  letters.  However  Sperling  gave  sub-
jects a cuing system: a high tone for the top
row, a medium tone for the middle row and a
low tone for the bottom row. When cued, sub-
jects could report 3-4 from any given row. 
In  a  different  paradigm,  honeybees  were
trained on a maze in which they had to choose
to go either left or right at a T-junction to get a
reward. At the entrance of the maze there were
dots on each side and the bees had to choose
the side with more dots to get the reward. The
bees could learn to choose 4 rather than 3 but
not 5 rather than 4 (Gross et al. 2009). 
The  working  memory  significance  of
roughly 4 items is so ubiquitous that it stimu-
lated an article called “The magical number 4
in  short-term  memory:  A  reconsideration  of
mental storage capacity” (Cowan 2001). Up un-
til  5-10  years  ago,  “slot”  models  of  working
memory were popular. I think it would now be
agreed that roughly slot-like behavior emerges
from an underlying working memory system in
which there is a pool of resources that is distrib-
uted over items differently depending on num-
ber and complexity (Ma 2014). George Alvarez
& Patrick Cavanagh (2004) suggested that there
might be a limit of around 5 items of ideally
simple structure but Alvarez’s recent work sug-
gests a more complex picture in which there are
a  variety  of  components  of  working  memory
that may independently fit a more slot-like or a
more pool-like structure (Suchow et al. 2014).
Slot-like  working  memory  depends  on  simple
stimuli that are hard to confuse with one an-
other.  Stimuli  that have shown slot-like beha-
vior  include  alphanumeric  characters,  hori-
zontal/vertical rectangles and colors that differ
substantially from one another. (I am indebted
to conversations with Weiji Ma on this topic.)
So I would suggest that Chirimuuta’s be-
havioral  result  probably  depends  on  the  fact
that subjects had to hold a number of pairs of
digits and contrasts in mind in order to categor-
ize the next contrast. (You could try it yourself
for say 5 lengths.) They did well up to 4 such
pairs and then performance declined radically.
The article  contains an  anecdote  that  further
supports this idea:
DJT  [one  of  the  subjects  and  experi-
menters]  performed  an  experiment  in
which 4 contrasts of grating were chosen
that were close together whilst still allow-
ing near-perfect identification performance
over 50 trials of each: 1, 8, 18 and 27 dB.
[Note from NB: this is a different way of
quantifying contrast than the percentages
used here.]  In  the 50 trials  of  each con-
trast,  1  error  of  identification  was  made
for  each  of  the  8  and  18  dB  gratings.
Then, two more contrasts were added to
the stimulus set at the lower end (40 and
50 dB); contrast 40 dB should have been
easily discriminable from 27 dB. In fact,
addition of contrasts 40 and 50 dB resul-
ted in an increase in the errors of identific-
ation of the original set of four contrasts
over  50  trials  of  each  (8dB  –  2  errors;
18dB  –  9  errors;  27dB  –  6  errors).
(Chirimuuta & Tolhurst 2005a, p. 2965)
There are two notable aspects of this anecdote:
first,  performance  over  50  trials  of  each  of  4
contrasts were near perfect despite the fact that
the gratings covered only part of the spectrum
of contrasts. This suggests that the limit of 4
does not have to do with representations of con-
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trast per se. The second aspect is that in this
case  as  in  so  much  of  the  work  on  working
memory, adding more possibilities to a set of 4
decreases performance in the original set of 4. I
conclude  that  the  behavioral  result  probably
has more to do with working memory than with
any limit on perception.
Chirimuuta’s  second result,  the one that
motivates the idea that visual representations of
contrast  are  so  indeterminate  that  only  4-5
levels of identification are possible, is the mod-
eling result based partly on data from monkey
V1 neurons. (V1 is the first cortical area that
processes vision, the lowest level of the visual
system.) The striking fact about this result is
that it does not concern working memory at all
or indeed any kind of memory. It is only con-
cerned  with  perceptual  representation  in  V1.
The model of V1 neurons comes from another
paper that is concerned with the “dipper func-
tion”, a notable curve shape in which one con-
trast stimulus is “masked”—diminished by the
processing of another stimulus that follows right
after  it  (Chirimuuta &  Tolhurst 2005b).  The
model  predicts  that  V1  can  represent  4  con-
trasts perfectly with a sharp fall-off at 4, with a
capacity  to  represent  slightly  more  than  5
items. 
However, the model based on V1 neurons
gets some important facts wrong, for example it
predicts  poorer  performance  at  high  and  low
contrasts, whereas people actually do better at
high and low contrasts. A version of the model
with  some  postulated  features  that  are  not
based  on  anything  neural  can  get  that  right.
However, this “curve fitting” approach deprives
the  model  of  the  neurophysiological  support
that  motivated  the  original  model.  Another
problem with  the  model  is  that  what  is  pre-
dicted is “mutual information” shared between
contrast stimuli and V1 responses of 2.35 bits.
Mutual information is a measure of shared in-
formation—in this case between stimuli and V1
neurons. A mutual information value of 2 bits
would allow 22 (=4) contrast identifications; a
mutual information value of 3 bits would allow
23 (=8) identifications. This shared information,
as  Chirimuuta  notes  (Chirimuuta &  Tolhurst
2005a, p. 2968), is “essentially looking at per-
fect, 100% performance.” For this reason, mu-
tual information is not very useful as a psycho-
physical measure. And as Chirimuuta notes, its
utility is limited for another reason: it is a com-
pressive  measure  and  so  large  increases  in
neural activity can be expected to make small
differences  in  information.  The  issue  of  100%
performance is  especially troublesome since in
perceptual systems no performance can be per-
fect. In particular the convention for a “just no-
ticeable difference” is distinguishability 75% of
the time. So it is difficult to know how to com-
pare the absolute identification level of 2.35 bits
with a more visually sensible visual identifica-
tion level.
Further,  our experience seems to conflict
with the idea that we have distinct visual rep-
resentations of only 4-5 contrasts. A good repro-
duction  of  Figure  8 seems  to  reveal  6  phe-
nomenologically different contrasts even though
the figure covers only a third of the range of
contrasts.  And  the  Carrasco  results  apply  to
many different parameters, gap size, spatial fre-
quency, etc. You might test it out if you happen
to be near a brick wall. Look at the height of
one  brick,  two  bricks,  three  bricks  and  four
bricks.  If  you are  close  enough so  that  those
sizes look different from one another, ask your-
self whether there are other sizes that look dif-
ferent  from  all  four  of  those  sizes.  If
Chirimuuta’s result applies more widely, the an-
swer is no. It has to be said though that that
sense of distinctness could be due to discrimin-
atory abilities. 
Whatever the facts are about how precise
foveal attentive perception is, the next section
presents  evidence  that  it  is  not  more  precise
than inattentive peripheral perception. 
12 Attention may not increase 
representational precision
I said that if 2 things look the same when seen
in peripheral vision with at least one unatten-
ded,  but  the  same two things  look  determin-
ately  different  when seen foveally  and attent-
ively, then the phenomenal precision of the at-
tended  and  foveal  percepts  must  be  greater
than at least one of the prior percepts. (As I
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mentioned, the assumption of veridicality is re-
quired to justify the imprecise representational
contents of the peripheral percepts.) 
It  is  common  for  philosophers  to  claim
that attention increases “determinacy” of  per-
ception  (Boone 2013;  Nanay 2010;  Stazicker
2011a, 2011b, 2013; but not Speaks 2010). The
relevant kind of determinacy as I have been say-
ing is precision. But it will be useful to distin-
guish precision from other forms of determinacy.
Responses to attended stimuli are certainly less
variable than responses to unattended stimuli.
And attention increases acuity in the sense of
spatial resolution, e.g., the ability to distinguish
one dot from two dots. I will argue that spatial
attention may not increase precision even if it
reduces variability and acuity, and that further,
in a rationally designed system spatial attention
would not be expected to increase precision.
Yeshurun &  Carrasco (1998) showed that
attention can increase resolution, making sub-
jects (paradoxically) less likely to see the atten-
ded  stimulus.  For  textured  figures  like  the
square to the right of the fixation plus sign in
Figure 10, there is an optimal degree of resolu-
tion. If resolution is too high, the subjects miss
the forest for the trees, failing to see the larger
scale textured figures. Too low a resolution can
cause  subjects  to  miss  the  trees  as  well.  Ye-
shurun and Carrasco presented textured figures
at varying degrees of eccentricity. Since resolu-
tion is better for stimuli that are closer to the
fovea, this had the effect of presenting the fig-
ures at varying degrees of resolution. They also
varied  resolution  by  manipulating  where  sub-
jects were attending, using cues of the sort de-
scribed  earlier.  Putting together  the contribu-
tions to resolution from eccentricity and atten-
tion, they were able to show that there were dif-
ferent optimal degrees of resolution for different
figures.
One neural mechanism by which attention
increases resolution is shrinking of the “recept-
ive fields” of neurons in the visual system. Re-
call that a receptive field is the area of space
that a neuron responds to. Resolution increases
when neurons respond to smaller areas. Another
mechanism  is  the  shifting  of  receptive  fields
from adjacent areas that was mentioned earlier. 
As  I  mentioned,  the  sensitivity  of  high
“spatial  frequency”  channels  increases—prob-
ably  as  a  result  of  these  mechanisms.  Recall
that spatial  frequency in  the case of  a stripy
stimulus like the “Gabor patches” used in many
of the figures In this article (e.g., Figure 15) is a
measure of how dense the stripes are. Boosting
the sensitivity to high spatial frequencies makes
resolution higher, thereby improving perception
of textured figures  when the resolution is  too
low and impairing perception when resolution is
too  high.  The  Yeshurun  and  Carrasco  paper
concerns exogenous attention. Later work (Bar-
bot et al. 2012) shows that endogenous atten-
tion  is  more  flexible,  raising  or  lowering  the
sensitivities of  high spatial  frequency channels
so as to improve perception.
I mention the increase in resolution and
the  sensitivity  to  high  spatial  frequencies  in
order to be sure that the reader is distinguish-
ing these  matters  from an increase  in  preci-
sion.
Representational  precision is  a matter  of
how wide a range of values is allowed by the
representational content, what values are com-
patible  with  the  veridicality  of  the  percept.
(Phenomenal  precision  is  a  matter  of  “crisp-
ness” of the appearance.) One dot and two dots
may  look  the  same  in  peripheral  vision  even
though we can clearly see the difference in fo-
veal vision. That is a difference in acuity rather
than a difference in precision. Increasing preci-
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Figure 10: A textured figure used by Yeshurun & Car-
rasco (1998).  Using  stimuli  like  this  one,  stimuli  were
presented in which the square immediately to the right of
the  plus  sign  could  appear  at  different  eccentricities.
When the resolution was low in peripheral areas, atten-
tion increased the subjects’ ability to detect the square.
But when the resolution was high—nearer to the fixation
point--attention  decreased the subjects’ ability to detect
the square because the increased resolution obscured the
forest in favor of the trees.
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sion for representation is sharpening the repres-
entational content. 
The relation between variability and preci-
sion  is  more  complex.  Imprecision  is  often
cashed  out  in  terms  of  reliable  correlation
between a representation and the world (Sta-
zicker 2013). In that sense, since attention de-
creases  variability  it  must  increase  precision.
However, there are different sorts of noise. As
we will  see  in  the  first  experiment to  be  de-
scribed  below,  attention  may  decrease  noise
across  the  whole  spectrum  without  affecting
what might be thought of as intrinsic variation
in the signal and thus not increasing a kind of
systematic precision. As I will explain, the ex-
periment to be described helps us to precisify
what precision comes to.
I  will  describe two experiments that will
help to make the notion of precision more pre-
cise or at least concrete and will suggest that
spatial  attention  does  not  narrow  representa-
tional  precision.  Before I  do that,  let  me say
briefly why one should expect that spatial at-
tention will  not make the attended properties
any more precise. Increasing precision normally
involves suppression of responses outside the ex-
pected range. It would not make sense for a sys-
tem  to  be  designed  to  suppress  some  values
without  some indication  of  the  irrelevancy  of
those values. Spatial attention tunes for spatial
area,  suppressing  responses  to  other  spatial
areas (Montagna et al. 2009). So spatial atten-
tion can be expected to increase precision for
spacial location but not for contrast, size, spa-
tial frequency or speed.16 For feature-based at-
tention, the opposite is true. If one is looking
for  the red thing,  it  makes  sense  to suppress
sensitivity  to  other  colors.  Spatial  attention
should tune for space only and feature-based at-
tention should tune for the property attended
to.
The first experiment uses the “attentional
blink”, a phenomenon in which there is a series
of stimuli and two targets amid distractors. In
part of the experiment, the targets were squares
and the distractors circles. The general finding
is that if the subject consciously sees the first
16 This is oversimple since attention increases sensitivity to high spatial
frequencies (Barbot et al. 2012).
target square, and if the second target square is
presented 200-400 ms after the first square, the
subject will be much less likely to consciously
see the second square. The mechanism has been
shown to depend on the first target absorbing
the subject’s attention so that there is insuffi-
cient  attention  to  consciously  see  the  second
square.  The  second  square  is  described  as
“blinked”,  where  the  blinking  deprives  the
square of attention.  Asplund et al. (2014) used
this  technique  with  a  paradigm in  which  the
target squares were colored and in which sub-
jects  had  to  report  the  color  of  the  second
square by moving a mouse to click on a color
wheel that had 180 colors on it. The idea is that
the effect of attention on how intervalic the per-
ceptual representation is could be assessed by
examining the effect of the presence or absence
of attention on the precision of subjects’ identi-
fications of the color using the color wheel.
The  experimental  procedure  is  dia-
grammed in Figure 11. The subject saw a fixa-
tion  point  (lowest  square  on  the  left).  Then
there were 7-13 colored disks, then a target, T1,
a square that was either black or white (RSVP
= rapid serial visual presentation), then some
number of colored disks, then another square,
then 3 more disks. Then subjects reported the
color of T2 using the color wheel. They got im-
mediate feedback in how far off  they were on
identifying  the  color  (in  degrees  on  the  color
wheel) for 500 ms, then they indicated whether
T1 was white or black. If  the subject got T1
wrong, that trial’s report of T2 was disregarded.
This design allowed for comparison of precision
of reporting the color of T2 between trials in
which  attention  was  maximally  reduced  (T2
presented 2 items after  T1,  described as  “lag
2”) with trials in which the lag was so long or
so short that there was no attentional blink at
all. The key result is that although the lag time
was  strongly  correlated  with  the  average  cor-
rectness of the response (as always in the atten-
tional blink), the precision of the responses that
were not random was not affected significantly.
The same experiment was done with faces using
a slightly different form of the attentional blink.
T1 was one of two faces that subjects had to re-
cognize and the response wheel  for T2 had a
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series of 150 face morphs based on 3 faces, with
49 intermediate faces interposed between them.
The results were the same with faces as with
colors. The key result for both studies is that
the  identification  of  T2  was  either  random
(much more likely at the critical “lag 2” for an
attentional  blindness  effect  of  200-400  ms)  or
just as precise at lag 2 as at lag 8. Note that
the experiment does not directly test the preci-
sion of any single percept. The assumption is
that the precision of representation of a blinked
color will be reflected in how tightly clustered
the  different  responses  are.  Asplund et  al.
(2014) conclude (p.  6):  “Across  both stimulus
classes  (colors  and  faces)  and  experimental
designs …, we found that the reported precision
of a target item is not affected in the AB [atten-
tional  blink],  even though our paradigms had
the sensitivity to detect such effects.”
But wait, you may ask: “Didn’t I say that
attention  decreases  variability?  And  why  is
there supposed to be a difference between (the
inverse of) variability and precision?” (Indeed,
the inverse of “variance”, one measure of vari-
ability, is a common notion of precision.) The
answer is that if you look at the raw data in
this  experiment,  the  blinked  color  identifica-
tions  are  much  more  variable  than  the  ones
that  are  not  blinked.  However,  the  authors
were  able  to show via  modeling that  the  re-
sponse  distribution  was  a  superimposition  of
two very different distributions. One distribu-
tion was  uniform over  the  whole  color  wheel
with no clustering around one color,  whereas
the  second  distribution  was  tightly  clustered
around  the  correct  color,  just  as  tightly  as
when the color stimulus was not blinked. They
reasoned  that  the  first  (random) distribution
represented cases in which the subject simply
did not see the stimulus.  However,  when the
subject did see the stimulus,  the precision of
the  response  was  just  as  if  it  had  not  been
blinked. (They considered and rejected a “vari-
able precision” model that predicted the data
less well;  van den Berg et al. 2012). So overall
variability of response is not a good guide to
the  precision  of  the  representation.  And  this
shows an important flaw in crude correlational
approaches to precision. The precision of a per-
ceptual representation should not be taken to
be a matter of how well perceptual representa-
tion correlates with stimuli since what is really
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Figure  11:  Procedure from  Asplund et al. (2014). Understanding of this diagram is aided by color reproduction.
Thanks to Chris Asplund for supplying this figure.
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relevant is the cases in which the subject actu-
ally sees the stimulus.
This  point  is  illustrated in  Figure  12 in
which  the  response  error  profile  for  lag  2  in
which the attentional blink is most powerful is
compared with the response error profile for lag
8 in which the attentional blink is least power-
ful.  The  widths  of  the  distributions  are  the
same. What differs is the number of random re-
sponses as indicated by the higher “tails” of the
distributions. 
Note the difference between precision and
veridicality  in  this  experiment.  Precision  is  a
matter of how tightly the responses cluster and
veridicality is a matter of whether the responses
cluster around the value of the item that was
seen regardless  of  how tightly they cluster.  If
the  color  seen  was  focal  red,  responses  could
pick out focal green in a very precise manner,
but  be  non-veridical  nonetheless.  Conversely,
the average of the responses might be the color
seen (focal red) and thus the responses are on
the average veridical even though the intervalic
content is very wide. 
An objector might say that the cases in
which  the  blinked  stimulus  is  reported  in  a
non-random manner might be cases in which
it was not in fact deprived of attention by the
first  percept.  Imaging  studies  of  the  atten-
tional blink do suggest a general deprivation
of attention of  the blinked stimulus (Sergent
et al. 2005) but I don’t know of one that looks
specifically at this issue. There are always po-
tential confounds and the general remedy is to
approach  the  same  issue  in  more  than  one
way. In the case of this result, the same con-
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Figure 12: This is a modified form of a figure from Asplund et al. (2014). The figure compares response errors for lag
2—the value with the maximum effect of the attentional blink with lag 8—the value with the minimum attentional
blink. What the figure shows is that the precision of the responses in which the subject actually saw the stimulus was
the same. And the figure shows an increase in random responses for the blinked stimulus. Thanks to Chris Asplund for
supplying the figure which has been modified here.
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clusion has been reached by approaches that
do not share vulnerabilities. 
Another  approach  recorded  from  single
neurons in a monkey visual area (V4) that is
known to be sensitive to shape and form (David
et  al. 2008).  Orientation  tuning was  not  nar-
rowed by spatial attention, but it was narrowed
by attention to a specific orientation—feature-
based  attention.  A recent  review (Ling et  al.
2014) summarizes this approach as follows: 
Although initial physiological reports sug-
gested that directing spatial  attention to
an item sharpens the band-width of orient-
ation-selective cells in macaque visual area
V4…, this was later shown not to necessar-
ily be the case. Follow-up studies using a
more  sensitive  measure  for  tuning  band-
width found no effect of spatial attention
on  the  width  of  the  orientation  tuning
function...  Rather,  these  studies  instead
only found changes in the responsivity and
baseline firing rate of neurons coding for
the spatially attended location. Thus, the
neurophysiological evidence appears to in-
dicate that spatially attending to a loca-
tion leaves a neuron’s feature tuning unaf-
fected.
A psychophysical study came to the same con-
clusion, that spatial attention boosts activation
but not precision.
Ling et al. (2009) contrasted spatial  and
feature-based attention. The stimuli  were ran-
dom-dot cinematograms in which dots move in
one direction or another for short distances. In
the low noise condition shown on the left side of
Figure 13, the dots show a high degree of coher-
ence in that most of them move in the same dir-
ection. As noise increases, motion coherence de-
creases. Subjects had to make a series of judg-
ments  of  the  orientation  of  overall  motion  of
these  cinematograms.  In  the  spatial  attention
version, they could be cued as to the place the
stimulus would appear. In the feature-based at-
tention version, they were cued to one of four
directions of motion and had to report the ob-
served motion as a  clockwise or counterclock-
wise deviation from the cued motion. Ling et al.
were especially interested in comparing two dif-
ferent models for how attention boosts perform-
ance in detecting the direction of motion, using
stimuli that could move in different directions.
See Figure 14.
According to the gain model of (a), the re-
sponse  to  the  stimulus  is  increased  as  if  the
volume—i.e.,  the signal  strength—were simply
turned  up  equally  for  all  movement-direction
detectors. (Orientations of motion are indicated
by arrows along the x-axis. The signal strength
was  turned  up  in  the  sense  that  the  signal
strength prior  to  attention is  multiplied by a
constant factor. For the values that are already
high—i.e., at the peak—the multiplying a large
value by a constant factor has a bigger effect
than at the tails of the distribution where mul-
tiplying the constant factor times a zero yields
zero.)  According  to  the  sharpening  model  of
(b), the effect of attention is not to turn up the
response but rather to suppress the irrelevant
noise in the stimulus, narrowing the intervalic
range of the response profile. These two models
make  different  predictions  for  “threshold  vs.
noise” curves pictured in the bottom of Figure
14. The gain model predicts an increase in dis-
criminability  only  when  the  external  noise  is
low  compared  with  internal  noise.  When  ex-
ternal noise is low, there is a benefit to turning
up the volume— even though the volume in-
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Figure 13: Random-dot cinematograms in which dots exhibit
local motion. In the low noise condition, most of the dots are
moving in the same direction. As noise increases, the spread of
directions increases and motion coherence decreases. From an
experiment comparing spatial attention with feature-based at-
tention. With permission of Vision Research.
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creases  both  signal  and  external  noise—since
the  effect  of  turning  up  the  volume  is  to
“swamp” the internal noise. (Internal noise is a
blanket term for variation in the visual system,
whatever  makes  visual  responses  vary  even
when the external signal remains the same.) As
external signal and noise dominates the percept,
internal  noise  decreases  in  importance.  This
kind of gain has a similar effect as decreasing
the internal noise.  If  internal noise were zero,
there would be no benefit at all in raising the
volume on both the signal and the noise. The
benefit of raising the volume however dwindles
away as  external  noise  increases  since  the  in-
crease in volume increases the effects of external
noise  too.  This  is  indicated  by  the  lowered
threshold on the bottom left of (a) where the
advantage in lowering the threshold decreases as
external noise rises. 
A  different  picture  emerges  from  the
model of the bottom right (b) where the benefit
of  tuning  is  greatest  when  external  noise  is
greatest. (Note that if there is no external noise,
tuning is of no benefit.) Thus the benefit should
increase  as  noise  increases  as  pictured  in  the
bottom right (b). These models were tested by
a procedure somewhat like that in Figure 5, ex-
cept using voluntary attention. A line indicated
where the subjects were supposed to attend and
then  a  tone  indicated  that  the  stimulus  was
about to appear. Subjects could be cued to one
of 4 locations where their task was to report the
direction  of  motion  of  a  stimulus.  Sometimes
there was a tone but no cue. The result was un-
equivocal: a pattern like that of the bottom left
of Figure 14, indicating an effect of gain but no
tuning. “The data showed that spatial attention
yielded benefits strictly with low external noise,
and no benefits with high external noise” (Ling
et al. 2009, p. 1201). They also used the same
setup with feature-based attention in which the
subjects  were cued with an indicator  of  what
the direction of the stimulus would be. In this
version, there was both tuning and gain, show-
ing a hybrid of the patterns of a and b in Fig-
ure 14.
Again,  spatial  attention does  not  appear
to narrow representational precision, contrary to
the representationist position. This is graphic-
ally shown in the tuning model of  Figure  14:
suppression of values outside the selected value
directly reduces precision. This is what does not
happen with spatial attention.
But why does this result concern repres-
entational  precision  rather  than  phenomenal
precision? I considered an analog of this ques-
tion concerning peripheral  vision in section  2.
There I noted that the anatomical asymmetries
that are the probable basis of the inhomogeneit-
ies  discussed  are  bound to  affect  unconscious
perception in the same way as conscious percep-
tion. And a similar point applies here. The nar-
rowing of receptive fields that is the main un-
derlying  mechanism  of  the  attentional  effects
concerns perception simpliciter rather than con-
scious perception per se. As I mentioned earlier,
spatial  attention  operates  in  unconscious  per-
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Figure 14: Two models of how attention boosts perform-
ance. According to the gain model indicated in the top left
(a), the boost derives from increasing the firing of all direc-
tional feature detectors. The arrows along the x-axis indic-
ate receptors for motion in different directions. The dotted
lines represent the change due to attention (as compared
with the solid lines). The tuning model at the top right (b)
says performance is boosted by sharpening the response, de-
creasing the range of the intervalic content, as indicated by
the narrowed shape of the dotted line. See the text for an
explanation  of  the  bottom  diagrams.  From  Ling et  al.
(2009). With permission of Vision Research.
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ception in a similar manner to conscious percep-
tion (Chica et al. 2011;  Kentridge et al. 2008;
Norman et al. 2013). 
The dimensions used in both of the experi-
ments described are “metathetic” as opposed to
“prothetic”  (Stevens &  Galanter 1957).  Pro-
thetic  dimensions  have  a  zero  point  and  in-
trinsic directionality, whereas metathetic dimen-
sions  have  neither  (Fuller &  Carrasco 2006).
Color saturation is prothetic because there is a
zero point—achromaticity—and colors are more
or less saturated. Hues are metathetic. At least
for primary hues such as red and green, neither
has  more  of  any  hue.  Carrasco’s  work  shows
that the attentional effects involved in increas-
ing size, speed, flicker rate and the like work for
prothetic  dimensions  like  color  saturation  but
not  metathetic  dimensions  like  hue  (Fuller &
Carrasco 2006). And that fact leads to the ques-
tion  of  whether  the  conclusion  that  attention
does not change precision depends on the mag-
nitude tested being metathetic. 
The  studies  on  prothetic  dimensions  are
not as easy to interpret as the ones I just de-
scribed. One reason is that for metathetic di-
mensions, the psychological meaning of a differ-
ence is roughly the same throughout the dimen-
sion.  A 90o shift  in direction has roughly the
same significance independently of the starting
direction. But for prothetic magnitudes that is
dramatically  not  so.  A one  inch  change  in  a
length of .01 inch has a different psychological
significance than a one inch change in a length
of  one  mile.  Baldassi &  Verghese (2005)  give
some evidence that spatial  attention does not
change the intervalic range of detection of con-
trast—a metathetic magnitude—though feature-
based attention does narrow intervalic range. 
The review I mentioned (Ling et al. 2014)
surveys  many  different  studies  on  this  issue,
concluding (references removed):
By and large, studies using psychophysical
techniques to assess  selectivity have con-
verged on results that square quite nicely
with the neurophysiological results…: fea-
ture-based attention to an item selectively
changes  psychophysical  tuning  curves…,
while  directing  spatial  attention  to  that
item leaves behavioral feature tuning un-
touched…
I mentioned that increasing precision normally
involves suppression of responses outside the ex-
pected range. There is no reason for spatial at-
tention to increase the precision of anything else
other  than  spatial  area.  In  particular,  why
would spatial attention suppress some directions
of motion and not others? However if attention
is directed towards motion in a certain direction
(feature based attention) then increasing preci-
sion does make sense. The point applies equally
to prothetic as to metathetic dimensions. Why
should  spatial  attention  tune  for  some values
but not others of contrast or gap size given that
tuning  involves  suppression  of  some  range  of
contrasts or gap sizes. So there is good reason
to expect these results to apply to prothetic di-
mensions.
Let me return to the issue of  peripheral
perception as compared with foveal perception.
I mentioned the experiment that shows that dis-
crimination of  contrast  in the periphery is  as
good as in the fovea. But there is an additional
fact about peripheral vision, a phenomenon of
“crowding” in which things lose the quality of
‘‘form...without  losing  crispness...’’  (Lettvin
1976). We can ignore crowding for the purposes
discussed here so long as we confine ourselves to
perception of what the visual system treats as
single  objects.  For  more  on  this,  see  Block
(2012, 2013).
To conclude, there is evidence that atten-
ded and foveal perception can be greater in phe-
nomenological  precision  without  being  greater
in representational precision, contrary to repres-
entationism.  In  direct  realist  terms,  there  is
evidence  that  attended  and  foveal  perception
can  be  greater  in  phenomenological  precision
without involving awareness of more precise en-
vironmental properties.
13 Abstraction and indeterminacy
The purpose of  this  section is  to argue that
the 6% difference between the attended 22%
and  unattended  28% patches  underestimates
the effect of attention. The reader who is will-
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ing to take that on faith can skip to the con-
clusion.
I argued that since the attended 22% and
unattended 28% patches  look  the  same when
seen in peripheral vision but look determinately
different from one another when seen foveally
and attentively, we can conclude that the preci-
sion of the phenomenal and therefore represent-
ational content of the attended foveal percepts
must be greater than that of the prior percepts
—if representationism is true and all the men-
tioned percepts are veridical.  The reader may
not  be  convinced  however  that  the  22% and
28%  patches  do  look  determinately  different
when seen foveally and attentively. Perhaps the
sense that they look different is a matter of an
ability to discriminate rather than an appreci-
ation of appearances that are determinately dif-
ferent.
The Carrasco lab experiments reported so
far  use  stimuli  that  are  4o from the  fixation
point. But you might have noticed that when
you fixated the bottom left square in Figure 9,
you could  also  see  the  28% patch  to  the  far
right.  And some of  the Carrasco lab’s experi-
ments have been done with 9o angle of separa-
tion.
If one combines the two different angles of
separation  as  in  Figure  15 an  attended  16%
patch looks the same in contrast as an unatten-
ded 28% patch, a larger difference than men-
tioned earlier for this absolute level of contrast.
(The differences produced by attention increase
with absolute level.) Of course the logic of the
case is  the same as before.  I  introduce it be-
cause I  think it  is  easier to be sure that the
patches in Figure  15 look determinately differ-
ent when foveated and attended.
Of course there is a difference between the
relations  between  the  perceiver  and  the  two
patches—in  the  different  angles  of  separation
from the fixation point. Does that ruin the case
for my purposes? Note that there was a difference
in the relations between the perceiver and the two
patches in the experiments of Figure 6 and Figure
7, namely one was on the left of fixation and the
other was on the right. Why would there be a dif-
ference in relevance between left/right and num-
ber of degrees of peripherality? 
Recall that imprecise contents were intro-
duced in the first place via the following reason-
ing. An attended 22% patch looks the same as
an unattended 28% patch.  But both percepts
with  that  same  contrast  phenomenology  are
veridical. In order for percepts with that phe-
nomenology of contrast to be grounded in the
representation  of  contrast,  the  imprecision  of
the representational content has to be at a min-
imum  22%-28%  (inclusive  of  22%  and  28%).
Suppose the representationist had said “No no,
those phenomenologies are different since one is
leftish and one is rightish so there can be no le-
gitimate demand for a representational content
in  virtue  of  which  they  have  the  same  phe-
nomenology.  That  argument  would  look  silly
and be silly because we have an appreciation of
how contrast looks independently of which side
it is on. We can easily abstract the percept of
contrast from a total percept of contrast on the
left or contrast on the right. The sense of ‘ab-
stract’ here is a question of appreciation of the
phenomenology  of  contrast  independently  of
perceived  location:  I  speak  of  abstraction  be-
cause location is abstracted away from.”
I suggest that the same reasoning applies
to Figure 15 even though the difference in peri-
pherality is causally implicated in producing the
apparent contrast. The point is that we have an
appreciation  of  that  contrasty  look  independ-
ently of degree of peripherality and can appreci-
ate that the two patches look the same in con-
trast when I am attending to the one on the
left. The point is that a 16% patch can look the
same in contrast as a 28% patch with the right
distribution of attention and we need a repres-
entational  account  of  what  it  is  in  virtue  of
which  these  apparent  contrasts  are  the  same.
And with respect to that issue there is nothing
illicit about comparing 4o with 9o. 
The issue of abstraction I just mentioned
comes up often in discussions of problem cases
for  representationism.  Consider  the  phenom-
enal  difference  in  seeing  the  round  rim  of  a
drinking glass and feeling it with one’s hand.
Both are percepts of one property, circularity,
but the phenomenology is  different.  How can
representationists cope with this case? Michael
Tye (1995, p. 157;  2000, p. 93-95) has noted
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that the “total” percepts involve representation
of different properties. These “collateral” prop-
erties might be shininess for the visual percept
of the circularity and temperature for the tact-
ile experience. The difference between the per-
cepts  can  be  blamed  on  the  perceptions  of
these different properties. That is, what we are
visually  representing  is  circularity-&-shininess
and what one is tactually representing is circu-
larity-&-coldness. Can one abstract the visual
impression of circularity from the total visual
percept? Can one abstract the tactile impres-
sion  of  circularity  from the total  tactile  per-
cept? Tye says he cannot make sense of such
abstraction.  However,  our  ability  to  abstract
shape  from location  on  the  right  vs  the  left
suggests  the  Principle  of  Spatial Abstraction:
perceptual  placing  of  a  feature  at  a  location
can be abstracted from the perception of the
location.  I  have  a  visual  appreciation  of  the
color of an object even as it moves, changing
location. To the extent that this principle is ac-
cepted it licenses the use of Figure  15 in the
premise that the contrast percepts are determ-
inately different. 
14 Conclusion
I  can  now  summarize  the  overall  argument.
First, the short version. The 22% patch and the
28% patch look different when foveated and at-
tended one after the other. However, fixating in
between them and attending to the 22% patch,
they look the same. How can this be explained
representationally  without  supposing  that  the
precision of attentive foveal vision is narrower
than that  of  inattentive peripheral  vision? As
before, this is a burden of proof argument that
does not explicitly utilize the idea of phenom-
enal precision. 
And as before, here is the long version:
1. The attended 22% patch and the unattended
28% patch, being the same in contrast-phe-
nomenology are the same in contrast-repres-
entational contents.
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Figure 15: If you fixate at the “+” sign and attend to the left patch, it should look approximately equal in contrast to
the right patch. My thanks to Jared Abrams for help in constructing this figure.
www.open-mind.net
2. Both are veridical.
3. The contrast attributed by vision to the two
patches has a minimum span of 22%-28%.
4. Attended  and  foveal  percepts  of  22%  and
28%  (seen  sequentially)  are  determinately
different in phenomenology.
5. Phenomenal precision principle: the phenom-
enal precision of the percepts of the patches
seen attended and foveally is narrower than
the phenomenal precision of at least one of
the percepts seen in the periphery with only
one attended. And it is plausible to suppose
it  is  the  unattended  percept  that  has  the
wider precision.
6. So the phenomenal precision of the attended
foveal  percepts  must  be  narrower  than  at
least one of the peripheral percepts (probably
the unattended one).
7. Representationism requires that a difference
in  phenomenal  precision  be  grounded  in  a
commensurate  difference  in  representational
precision.
8. So representationism requires that the preci-
sion of the foveal attended percepts be nar-
rower  than  at  least  one  of  peripheral  per-
cepts. We have already seen that peripheral-
ity pre se probably does not decrease preci-
sion so if precision is decreased, it probably is
due to withdrawal of attention. But empirical
results suggest that withdrawal of attention
does not decrease precision.
9. Conclusion:  there  is  some  reason  to  think
that the phenomenology of perception is not
grounded in its representational content.
Thus, for the perception of some properties, we
have reason to believe that the representational
content  of  perception  neither  grounds  nor  is
grounded by the phenomenology of perception.
I argued that an attended .20o gap looks
the same in respect of size as an unattended .
23o gap.  The  comparative  percept—the  gaps
looking the same—is illusory. But what about
the percepts of each gap, considered separately?
I argued that we would need a good reason to
suppose that one but not the other is illusory
and that the view that that both are illusory
would undermine the notion of representational
content  altogether.  I  said  that  both  are  (or
rather  can  be  in  normal  circumstances)
veridical. A similar point applies to the version
of the experiments involving contrast in which
an attended 22% patch looks the same in con-
trast as an unattended 28% patch. If the two
patches look the same and if looking the same is
a  matter  of  sameness  in  representational  con-
tent, and if the percepts are veridical, the size
properties the patches are represented as having
must be intervalic. And the interval—an index
of precision—must be wide enough to encom-
pass both patches. So the representational con-
tent has to have a precision range of 6%. And
further  considerations  I  mentioned  suggest  a
range of 12%. The phenomenal precision prin-
ciple says if percepts of 22% and 28% are phe-
nomenally  the  same  with  one  unattended  in
peripheral  vision  but  determinately  different
when  attended and foveal,  then  the  attended
and foveal percepts must have a narrower phe-
nomenal precision than at least one of the peri-
pheral percepts. The 22% and 28% patches do
look determinately different if foveated and at-
tended.  So  the  attended  and  foveal  percepts
must  have  a  narrower  phenomenal  precision
than one of the peripheral percepts. The only
way that this can happen on the representation-
ist point of view is if one of the peripheral rep-
resentational content is less precise than the fo-
veal attended content. But experimental results
that I cited suggest that may not be true. It
may not be true of foveal vs peripheral vision
independently of attention, and it may not be
true  for  attention  independently  of  foveal  vs
peripheral perception.
In the section on inhomogeneities  of  the
visual  field,  I  mentioned a route to the same
conclusion  based  on introspection.  And I  will
update  that  point  to  include  attention.  The
more introspective route is this: it is natural to
feel that the phenomenology of seeing the con-
trast between the lines and spaces on a piece of
lined  paper  attentively  and  foveally  differs  in
precision  from seeing  the same lines  inattent-
ively and peripherally. The foveal attentive per-
cept  seems  more  “crisp”  than  the  inattentive
peripheral percept. As we have seen, location is
indeed represented more precisely but the same
is not true for other properties such as hue or
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contrast.  If  this  intuitive  judgment  is  correct,
there is introspective evidence for a discrepancy
between  the  precision  of  phenomenology  and
the precision of representational content.
As I mentioned at the outset, the phenom-
enal precision principle needs more clarification
and justification. It depends on notions of over-
lapping  and  of  determinately  different  phe-
nomenologies that are not as clear as one would
like. My rationale is that if any advance in un-
derstanding of the phenomenology of perception
is  possible,  it  will  have  to  start  with  under-
developed ideas. I believe that there is enough
in these ideas to give some credence to the con-
clusion. A second issue is whether the percepts
that  I  say are determinately different  in  phe-
nomenology really are. 
The reader will have noticed that for the
experimental results I have discussed it can of-
ten be difficult to figure out what aspects of the
results  concerned  visual  phenomenology  and
what aspects concern visual representation. As I
mentioned earlier we have a real science of per-
ception but very little science of the phenomen-
ology of perception. If we are ever to turn what
we know about perception into a scientific ap-
proach to the phenomenology of perception, we
have  no  alternative  but  to  start  with  some
vague intuitive notions and proceed from there.
Although  there  are  some  loose  ends,  I
think I have said enough to suggest a discon-
nect  between  the  representational  content  of
perception and what it is like to perceive.
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Glossary
Acuity Also known as spatial resolution-- is the ability to resolve elements of stimuli. 
Common measures in the case of vision are the extent to which the subject can 
distinguish one dot from two dots, detect a gap between two figures, determine 
whether a rotating figure is rotating clockwise rather than counter-clockwise, as-
certain whether two line segments are co-linear, distinguish a dotted from a solid 
line or detect which side of a Landolt Square a gap is on. 
Attention William James (1890, p. 404) famously said attention “…is the taking possession 
by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultan-
eously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of con-
sciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to 
deal effectively with others.” Except for the exclusion of unconscious attention, 
most scientists would accept something like that characterization today. Spatial at-
tention is attention directed to portion of environmental space and is distinct from
attention to a thing or a property.
Content See representational content. 
Contrast Contrast in an environmental layout is often defined as the average difference in 
luminance between light and dark areas. (Luminance is the amount of light reflec-
ted.) More specifically, it is the luminance difference between the lightest and 
darkest areas divided by the sum of those luminances. There are alternative ways 
of defining the notion but the differences won’t matter here. 
Determinately different For items to look determinately different in contrast, their contrast phenomenolo-
gies cannot be almost completely overlapping. I noted that this notion makes sense
from a representationist perspective. I said that if one patch is represented as 10%-
30% in contrast and another patch as 10.5%-30.5% the representationist would 
need a good reason to deny that the phenomenologies almost completely overlap. 
Given that representationism is committed to phenomenal precision and phenom-
enal overlap, it is legitimate to assume them in an argument against representa-
tionism. 
Diaphanousness G. E. Moore (1903) famously said “... the moment we try to fix our attention 
upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as
if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of 
blue, all we can see is the blue; the other element is as if it were diaphanous ...”
Direct realism The view that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is grounded in 
direct awareness of objects and properties in the world.
Endogenous attention Endogenous attention is voluntary—what people often mean by “paying atten-
tion”.
Exogenous attention Exogenous spatial attention is attention that is attracted, automatically by a 
highly visible change. It is sometimes referred to as “transient” attention, whereas 
endogenous spatial attention is “sustained”. Exogenous spatial attention peaks by 
120 ms after the cue, whereas endogenous spatial attention requires at least 300 
ms to peak and has no known upper temporal limit.
Fixation To fixate a thing or area of space is to point your eyes at it.
Fovea The fovea is the high density center of the retina. Foveal vision is the only vision 
that can be 20/20. If you hold your hand at arm’s length, your foveal perception 
encompasses about double the width of your thumb.
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Gabor patches The fuzzy (actually sinusoidal) grids in Figure 1 and other figures.
Grounding phenomenology is grounded in representational content just in case it is in virtue 
of the representational content of an experience that it has the phenomenology it 
has. 
Identity formulation of representa-
tionism
What it is for an experience to have a certain phenomenal character is for it to 
have a certain representational content.
Landolt Square See Figure 2.
Phenomenal precision principle (one form) If two things look the same in peripheral vision but determinately dif-
ferent in foveal vision, then the phenomenal precision of foveal vision is narrower 
than that of peripheral vision. 
Phenomenal precision As with everything phenomenal, nothing like a definition is possible. The best you 
can do is use words to point to a phenomenon that the reader has to experience 
from the first person point of view. The experience of a color as red is less precise 
than the experience of a color as crimson. According to representationism, phe-
nomenal precision is just the phenomenology of the precision of representational 
content. We experience a percept with representational content of 10%-20% as 
having more precision than we experience a percept with representational content 
10%-30%. For a direct realist, phenomenal precision is just the precision of the 
properties we are directly aware of. We can be directly aware of properties with 
different precisions, for example, crimson, or alternatively red. Similarly we can be
directly aware of a 10%-20% contrast property and also a 10%-30% contrast prop-
erty and the difference constitutes a phenomenal precision difference.
Prothetic vs metathetic Prothetic dimensions have a zero point and intrinsic directionality, whereas meta-
thetic dimensions have neither.
Receptive field In vision, the receptive field of a neuron is the area of space that a neuron re-
sponds to. In tactile perception the receptive field of a neuron is often gauged 
physiologically—the field of sensory receptors that feed to that neuron.
Representational content Condition of veridicality. A simple percept consists of a representation of an envir-
onmental property and a singular element that picks out an individual item 
(Burge 2010). The representational content is satisfied when the referent of the 
singular element has the property represented by the property-representation.
Representational Precision The precision of a representation is a matter of the intervalic range. For example, 
the precision of a representation of contrast of 10%-20% is narrower than a repres-
entation of 10%-30%. Precision in the sense used here is not a matter of indeterm-
inacy of interval borders.
Spatial frequency A measure of how closely spaced light and dark areas are. One could think of it 
with regard to the Gabor patches as a matter of stripe density.
Supervenience formulation of rep-
resentationism
If phenomenology supervenes on representational content, there can be no differ-
ence in the phenomenology of perception without a difference in its representa-
tional content.
Veridicality The veridicality of the most basic percept representations is a matter of the item 
referred to by the singular element having the property represented by the prop-
erty representation.
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